His description of Okinawa as Japan’s ‘war state’ could also apply to the role of Guam and Hawai’i in American policy.\u00a0\u00a0 Unfortunately, his critique of U.S. military interventions and wars does not include Guam, Hawai’i or the other American colonies, some of the earliest casualties of the American Empire.<\/p>\n
>><<<\/p>\n
http:\/\/japanfocus.org\/-Gavan-McCormack\/3317<\/a><\/p>\n Gavan McCormack<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cIt is incredible how as soon as a people become subject, it promptly falls into such complete forgetfulness of its freedom that it can hardly be roused to the point of regaining it, obeying so easily and so willingly that one is led to say that this people has not so much lost its liberty as won its enslavement.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Etienne de la Bo\u00e9tie (1530-1563). Discours de la servitude volontaire ou le Contr’un<\/em> (Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, or the Anti-Dictator).[1]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n For a country in which ultra-nationalism was for so long a problem, the weakness of nationalism in contemporary Japan is puzzling. Six and a half decades after the war ended, Japan still clings to the apron of its former conqueror. Government and opinion leaders want Japan to remain occupied, and are determined at all costs to avoid offence to the occupiers. US forces still occupy lands they then took by force, especially in Okinawa, while the Government of Japan insists they stay and pays them generously to do so. Furthermore, despite successive revelations of the deception and lies (the secret agreements) that have characterized the Ampo relationship, one does not hear any public voice calling for a public inquiry into it. [2] Instead, on all sides one hears only talk of \u201cdeepening\u201d it. In particular, the US insists the Futenma Marine Air Station on Okinawa must be replaced by a new military complex at Henoko, and with few exceptions politicians and pundits throughout the country nod their heads.<\/p>\n Okinawa in the East China Sea. Why the Ryukyus are the \u201cKeystone of the Pacific\u201d for US strategic planners<\/strong><\/p>\n Chosen dependence is what I describe as Client State-ism (Zokkoku-shugi<\/em>). [3] It is not a phenomenon unique to Japan, nor is it necessarily irrational. To gain and keep the favor of the powerful, dependence can often seem to offer the best assurance of security for the less powerful. Dependence and subordination during the Cold War brought considerable benefits, especially economic, and the relationship was at that time subject to certain limits, mainly stemming from the peculiarities of the American-imposed constitution (notably the Article 9 expression of commitment to state pacifism).<\/p>\n But that era ended, and instead of gradually reducing the US military footprint in Japan and Okinawa as the \u201cenemy\u201d vanished, the US decided to ramp it up. It pressed Japan\u2019s Self Defence Forces to cease being \u201cboy scouts\u201d (as Donald Rumsfeld once contemptuously called them) and to become a \u201cnormal\u201d army, able to fight alongside and if necessary instead of, US forces and at US direction, in the \u201cwar on terror,\u201d specifically in support of US wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It wanted Japanese forces to be integrated under US command, and it wanted greater access to Japan\u2019s capital, markets and technology. \u201cClient State\u201d status required heavier burdens and much increased costs than during the Cold War, but it offered greatly reduced benefits.<\/p>\n Ever since the Hatoyama team first showed signs of being likely to assume government, and talked of \u201cequality\u201d and of renegotiating the relationship, Washington has maintained a ceaseless flow of advice, demand and intimidation to push it into the kind of subservience that had become the norm. The same \u201cJapan experts\u201d and \u201cJapan-handlers\u201d that in LDP times offered a steady stream of advice to \u201cshow the flag,\u201d \u201cput boots on the ground\u201d in Iraq, and send the MSDF to the Indian Ocean, now send a steady drumbeat of: Obey! Obey! Obey! Implement the Guam Treaty! Build the new base at Henoko!<\/p>\n Yet, with the important exception of Okinawa, there is little sign of outrage in Japan. Instead, US demands are echoed by a chorus of Japanese voices agreeing that Hatoyama and his government be \u201crealistic.\u201d One well-placed Japanese observer recently wrote of the \u201cfoul odor\u201d he felt in the air around Washington and Tokyo given off by the activities of the \u201cJapan-expert\u201d and the \u201cpro-Japan\u201d Americans on one side and \u201cslavish\u201d \u201cUS-expert\u201d and \u201cpro-American\u201d Japanese on the other, both \u201cliving off\u201d the unequal relationship which they had helped construct and support.[4]<\/p>\n Another recent Japanese critic, quoting the passage from de la Bo\u00e9tie that prefaces this article, writes:<\/p>\n \u201cStruggling to be \u2018best\u2019 under the American umbrella, and taking it as matter for pride when cared for by the US, has become a structure in which \u2018servitude\u2019 is no longer just a necessary means but is happily embraced and borne. \u2018Spontaneous freedom\u2019 becomes indistinguishable from \u2018spontaneous servitude\u2019.\u201d [5]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n As the security treaty in its current form marks its 50th<\/sup> anniversary in 2010, it should be possible to reflect on the relationship, to continue it unchanged, straighten it out and revise it if necessary, or even to end it, but such reflection is blocked by a combination of cover-up of the past record, one-sided pressure to revise in a certain way, and political hype and rhetoric. As a result, in the year of the \u201cgolden Jubilee\u201d anniversary, a more unequal, misrepresented and misunderstood bilateral relationship between two modern states would be difficult to imagine.<\/p>\n Although Hatoyama called for an \u201cequal\u201d relationship, the truth is that the US state does not admit the possibility of equality in its relations with any other state. The \u201ccloseness\u201d and \u201creliability\u201d of an ally is simply a measure of its servility. According to one senior member of the cabinet of Britain\u2019s Tony Blair, looking back on her Government\u2019s role in the war on Iraq, despite being the US\u2019s supposedly closest of allies, \u201cWe ended up humiliating ourselves [with] unconditional, poodle-like adoration\u201d because the \u201cspecial relationship\u201d meant \u201cwe just abjectly go wherever America goes.\u201d[6] Her words deserve to be taken seriously by all America\u2019s allies.<\/p>\n Only twice have Japanese governments made an effort to think of an alternative to the dependence rooted in the treaties of 1951 (San Francisco) and 1960 (Ampo) that have formed the legal frame for the post-Occupation relationship. In 1994 the Higuchi Commission recommended to Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi that Japan revise its exclusively US-oriented, dependent diplomacy to become more multilateral, autonomous, and UN-oriented. [7] However, a US government commission headed by Joseph Nye then advised President Clinton almost precisely the opposite: since the peace and security of East Asia was in large part due to the \u201coxygen\u201d of security provided by US forces based in the region, the existing defence and security arrangements should be maintained, the US military presence in East Asia (Japan and Korea) held at the level of 100,000 troops rather than wound down, and allies pressed to contribute more to maintaining them. Higuchi was forgotten and the Nye prescription applied. Not until 2009 was there any serious questioning of the wisdom of the Nye formula.<\/p>\n It was Nye and his associates (notably Richard Armitage) who from 1995 drew up the detailed sets of post-Cold War policy prescriptions for Japan. Paradoxically, but also reflecting the \u201cClient State\u201d phenomenon, they came to be respected, even revered, as \u201cpro-Japanese\u201d or \u201cfriends of Japan.\u201d They and their colleagues drew the 2000 goal (in the \u201cArmitage-Nye Report\u201d) of turning the relationship into a \u201cmature\u201d alliance by reinforcing Japanese military subordination and integration under US command, removing barriers to the active service of Japan\u2019s Self-Defense Forces on \u201ccollective security\u201d missions, and taking the necessary steps towards revising the constitution, and in 2007 the further agenda of strengthening the Japanese state, revising the (still unrevised) constitution, passing a permanent law to authorize regular overseas dispatch of Japanese forces, and stepping up military spending.[8] The agreements on relocating US Forces in Japan (Beigun saihen<\/em>, 2005-6) and Guam Treaty (2009) were the detailed policy instruments towards those goals. The \u201cFutenma Replacement\u201d (Henoko) project formed a central plank.<\/p>\n As Hatoyama\u2019s team began to talk of equality and of an Asia-Pacific Community, it was Joseph Nye who issued a series of warnings, first spelling out (in December 2008) the acts that Congress would be inclined to see as \u201canti-American,\u201d prominent among them being any attempt to revise the Beigun Saihen<\/em> agreements (including the Futenma transfer).<\/p>\n The Treaty system whose anniversary is celebrated in 2010 has been unequal throughout its 50 years and is encrusted with deception and lies. The 1960 Treaty, rammed through the Diet in the pre-dawn hours and in the absence of the opposition, reconfirmed the (1951) division of the country into a demilitarized mainland \u201cpeace state\u201d Japan and a directly American-controlled Okinawan \u201cwar state.\u201d That division was maintained even when, in 1972, Okinawa was restored to nominal Japanese administration, in a deal that was also a model of deception. Firstly, the Okinawa \u201creturn\u201d was in fact not a \u201cgiving back\u201d but a \u201cpurchase,\u201d Japan paying the US even more (for \u201creturn\u201d of assets that in fact the US military retained) than it had paid seven years earlier to South Korea in compensation for forty years of colonial rule. And secondly, although the deal was declared to be one of reduction of Okinawan bases to mainland levels and without nuclear weapons, \u201ckaku-nuki hondo-nami<\/em>,\u201d it was neither. The \u201cwar state\u201d function remained central, bases remained intact and the US was assured (in the secret agreement, or mitsuyaku<\/em>) that its nuclear privilege would remain intact. Despite the nominal inclusion of Okinawa under the Japanese constitution, then and since it has continued in fact to be subject to the over-riding principle of priority to the military, that is, the US military, and in that sense, ironically, matching North Korea as a \u201cSongun<\/em>\u201d state.<\/p>\n Both governments prefer secret diplomacy to public scrutiny. By simple bureaucratic decision, Japan instituted a system of subsidy for US wars known as the \u201comoiyari<\/em>\u201d (sympathy) payments and expanded the scope of the security treaty from Japan and the \u201cFar East\u201d (according to Article 6) into a global agreement for the combat against terror. \u201cClient State\u201d Japan pays the US generously to continue, and not to reduce, its occupation.[9]<\/p>\n In mainland Japan, political and intellectual resistance to the Nye Client State agenda for Japan quickly crumbled nationally from 1995 with the return to power in Tokyo of the LDP, and the qualities of nationalism, democracy and constitutionalism were gradually relegated to second place to the \u201chigher\u201d cause of the alliance. In Okinawa, however, forced to bear the brunt of US military rule, civil democracy in the form of anti-base resistance grew steadily and the Client State agenda was never able to attain legitimacy. Consequently, for 14 years, through the terms of 8 Prime Ministers and 16 Defense Ministers, the 1996 bilateral agreement to substitute a Henoko base for the Futenma one made no progress. It was blocked by the fierce, uncompromising, popularly-supported Okinawan resistance.<\/p>\n In 2005 Okinawan civil society won an astonishing, against all odds, victory over the Koizumi government and its US backers, forcing the Government of Japan to abandon the \u201coffshore\u201d (on-reef, floating, pontoon structure) Henoko base project. It was a historic event in the history of democratic and non-violent civic activism. The government returned to the offensive in 2006, however, with its design for an enlarged, \u201con-shore\u201d Henoko base to be built on reclaimed land that would jut out into Oura bay from within the existing Camp Schwab marine base. This dual runway, hi-tech, air, land and sea base able to project force throughout Asia and the Pacific was far grander and more multifunctional than either the obsolescent, inconvenient and dangerous Futenma or the earlier offshore, pontoon-based \u201cheliport.\u201d<\/p>\n Oura Bay<\/strong><\/p>\n Though widely reported (with the subterfuge that is characteristic of the \u201cAlliance\u201d) as a US \u201cwithdrawal\u201d designed to reduce the burden of post-World War II American military presence in Okinawa, the 2006 agreement would actually further the agenda of integration of Japanese with US forces and subjection to Pentagon priorities and increase the Japanese financial contribution to the alliance (with Japan paying $6.1 billion for US marine facilities on Guam and up to $10 billion for a new Marine Base at Henoko). \u201cConsolidation\u201d and \u201creinforcement\u201d were the appropriate terms.<\/p>\n When Obama took office in early 2009, his Japan expert advisers seem to have advised him to move quickly to pre-empt any possible policy shift under a future DPJ government. They therefore exploited the interval when the LDP still enjoyed the two-thirds Lower House majority delivered by Koizumi\u2019s \u201cpostal privatization\u201d triumph of 2005 to press the 2006 agreement into a formal treaty and had Prime Minister Aso ram it through the Diet (in May 2009), so as to tie the hands of the Democratic Party forces about to be elected to government.<\/p>\n The Guam Treaty of 2009 was a defining moment in the US-Japan relationship, when both parties went too far<\/em>, the US in demanding (hastily, well aware that time was running out to cut a deal with the LDP) and Japan in submitting to something not only unequal (imposing obligations on Japan but not on the US), but also unconstitutional, illegal, colonial and deceitful. [10] Yet few Japanese seemed able to detect the \u201cfoul odor\u201d that arose from the deal.<\/p>\n In Okinawa, however, the Hatoyama DPJ election victory of August 2009, marked not only by the national party\u2019s electoral pledge to relocate the Futenma base outside the prefecture but by the clean sweep within the prefecture of committed anti-base figures, was taken as signalling that a new and favourable tide to Okinawa was rising. Opposition to any \u201cwithin Okinawa\u201d Futenma relocation became almost total across the political spectrum. When a committed anti-base candidate was elected mayor of Nago City on 24 January 2010, the threat to Oura Bay (and its dugong, coral and turtles) seemed drastically diminished. Having witnessed the lies and deceptions by which over 13 years the temporary, pontoon-supported \u201cheliport\u201d gradually evolved into the giant, reclamation, dual-runway and military port project of 2006, and having experienced the emptiness of the promise of economic growth in return for base submission, Okinawans were in no mood to be tricked again.<\/p>\n Author being briefed at the site of the Helipad Sit-In, Higashi village, Yambaru, Okinawa, 6 December 2009.<\/strong><\/p>\n If the two elections gave great heart to Okinawans, however, they also shook the \u201calliance\u201d relationship. Washington insisted on fulfilment of the Guam Treaty but the Henoko base could only now be built if Hatoyama was prepared to adopt anti-democratic measures of something akin to martial law to defy the will of Okinawan voters and protesters. That would be a peculiar way to celebrate the 50th<\/sup> anniversary of the \u201cAlliance.\u201d<\/p>\n At Honolulu in January 2010, Hillary Clinton insisted that the Ampo base system was indispensable for East Asian, especially Japan\u2019s, security and prosperity. It was essentially Joseph Nye\u2019s 1995 point. But is it true? The idea that the peace and security of East Asia depends on the presence of the Marines in Okinawa (the \u201cdeterrence\u201d function) is tendentious. There is today almost zero possibility of an attack on Japan by some armed force such as was imagined during the Cold War, and in any case the Marines are an expeditionary \u201cattack\u201d force, held in readiness to be launched as a ground force into enemy territory, not a force for the defense of Okinawa or Japan as stipulated under Article 4 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Since 1990, they have flown repeatedly from bases in Japan for participation in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the hullabaloo in Japan surrounding the Henoko project rests on a serious misunderstanding. As Ginowan City mayor, Iha Yoichi, has repeatedly shown from his analysis of US military planning documents, the Pentagon from 2006 has been committed to transfer main force Futenma marine units to Guam, upgrading it into the military fortress and strategic staging post covering the whole of East Asia and the Western Pacific (and thus undercutting the strategic importance of any new Okinawan base). [11] Iha\u2019s analysis was at least partially confirmed by a senior official of Japan\u2019s defense bureaucracy who described the 3rd<\/sup> Marine Division as a \u201cforce for deployment at any time to particular regions beyond Japan \u2026. not for the defense of particular regions.\u201d [12] In short, the Guam Treaty is concerned not with a Futenma substitute, or even with the defense of Japan, but with construction of a new, upgraded, multi-service facility that U.S. Marines will receive for free and will use as a forward base capable of attacking foreign territories.<\/p>\n US military footprint on Guam<\/strong><\/p>\n Virtually without exception, American officials, pundits and commentators support the Guam treaty formula and show neither sympathy nor understanding for Japanese democracy or Okinawan civil society, and by and large the Japanese pundits and commentators respond to this in \u201cslave-faced\u201d manner (do-gan<\/em> in Terashima\u2019s term). The Okinawa Times<\/em> (19 January 2010) notes that the 50th<\/sup> anniversary offered a \u201cchance to reconsider the Japan-US Security treaty that from Okinawa can only be seen as a relationship of dependence.\u201d To seriously \u201cre-consider\u201d would require wiping the \u201cslave faces\u201d off Japan\u2019s politicians and bureaucrats.<\/p>\n Hatoyama\u2019s government has enunciated idealistic sentiments \u2013 including statements such as from Party Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro saying that \u201cOkinawa beautiful blue seas must not be despoiled\u201d [13], and the postponing of a decision on the Futenma issue to May opened the issue to a measure of public scrutiny and discussion. However, neither the Prime Minister nor any of his senior ministers offered leadership or did anything to encourage discussion on the nature of the alliance or Okinawa\u2019s burdens. Instead, the Hatoyama government backed itself into a corner by assuming the legitimacy of the Guam Treaty, from which it followed that Futenma could not be returned unless or until it was replaced. Furthermore, prominent ministers, in \u201cClient State\u201d spirit, publicly identified with the position of the US government. Thus Foreign Minister Okada in Nago on 5 December 2009 pleaded with Okinawans to understand the \u201ccrisis of the alliance\u201d and the \u201cdifficulty\u201d of the negotiations. He suggested that Okinawans should have sympathy for President Obama \u201cwho might not be able to escape criticism for weakness in his dealings with Japan at a time of falling popularity\u201d if the Guam Treaty deal was not implemented. [14]<\/p>\n When Hatoyama announced the postponement of decision till May 2010, a Pentagon Press Secretary declared that the US \u201cdid not accept\u201d the Japanese decision, [15] and Joseph Nye referred to the DPJ as \u201cinexperienced, divided and still in the thrall of campaign promises,\u201d plainly meaning that attempts to renegotiate the Guam Agreement would not be tolerated. [16]<\/p>\n Yet, the mood in Okinawa unquestionably strengthened following the Hatoyama victory and the sweeping aside of the representatives of the \u201cold regime\u201d in Okinawa in August 2009. Opinion polls had long shown levels of around 70 per cent against the Guam formula (for Henoko construction), [17] but that figure rose steadily, so that one May 2009 survey found a paltry 18 per cent in favour of the Henoko option on which Washington was adamant, and by November that figure had fallen to 5 per cent; hardly anyone. [18] Both Okinawan newspapers, and the most prominent figures in Okinawan civil society, were strongly opposed. [19] The signals of anger and discontent rose to their peak in February 2010 with the adoption by the Okinawan parliament (the Prefectural Assembly) of an extraordinary resolution, unanimously demanding that Futenma be closed (moved \u201coverseas or elsewhere in Japan\u201d), [20] and Okinawa\u2019s 41 local district mayors also unanimously declared themselves of the same view. [21]<\/p>\n It meant that, while Tokyo struggled desperately to find a way to implement the Guam Treaty, Okinawa unanimously rejected it. There is no longer a \u201cprogressive-conservative\u201d divide in Okinawan politics on this question. The Mayor of Okinawa\u2019s capital, Naha, who in the past served as President of the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa, recently made clear that, as a prominent Okinawan conservative, he was disappointed by the Hatoyama government\u2019s reluctance to redeem its electoral pledge on Futenma and hoped the Okinawan people would remain united \u201clike a rugby scrum\u201d to accomplish its closure and return (i.e., not replacement). [22] No local government or Japanese prefecture in modern history had ever been at such odds with the national government.<\/p>\n Early in March, Defense Vice-Minister Nagishima Akihisa bluntly declared that the US demands would be met, even if it meant alienating Okinawans (who would be offered \u201ccompensation.\u201d) [23] With Hatoyama likewise insisting that he would honour alliance obligations, and the likelihood high that other formulas would prove unworkable or impossible to clear in such a tight timetable, Okinawans braced themselves. By May, 2010 Hatoyama would have to either reject the US demands, risking a major diplomatic crisis, or submit to them, announcing with regret that there is no \u201crealistic alternative\u201d to the \u201cV-shaped\u201d base at Henoko, thus provoking a domestic political crisis.<\/p>\n While official 50th<\/sup> anniversary commemorations celebrate the US military as the source of the \u201coxygen\u201d that guaranteed peace and security to Japan, it is surely time for Japanese civil society to point out that the same oxygen is elsewhere a poison, responsible for visiting catastrophe in country after country in East Asia and beyond, notably Korea (1950s and since), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1960s to 70s), Chile (1973), the Persian Gulf (1991), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2003-), and that now threatens Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and (again) Iran. Millions die or are driven into exile, and countries are devastated as the US military spreads its \u201coxygen\u201d by unjust, illegal and ruthless interventions and permanent occupations. The degree to which allied countries share criminal responsibility has been the subject of major public review in Holland (which found that the Iraq War was indeed illegal and aggressive) and in the UK (where the Chilcot Inquiry continues). It is time for similar questions to be asked in Japan of the Iraq and Afghan wars, and Japan\u2019s direct and indirect involvement in them.<\/p>\n The 50th<\/sup> anniversary should be a time for the Japan whose constitution outlaws \u201cthe threat or use of force in international affairs\u201d to reflect on how it has come to rest its destiny on alliance with the country above all others for whom war and the threat of war are key instruments of policy, and whether it should continue to offer unqualified support and generous subsidy, and whether it should continue to \u201chonour\u201d the Guam treaty, at all costs maintaining the marine presence in Okinawa. As a first step, it is time to debate openly the unequal treaties, secret diplomacy, lies, deception and manipulation of the last 50 years and time to reflect upon, apologize, and offer redress for the wrongs that have for so long been visited upon the people of Okinawa as a result.<\/p>\n Gavan McCormack is a coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal \u2013 Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. His <\/em>Client State: Japan in the American Embrace<\/a> was published in English (New York: Verso) in 2007 and in expanded and revised Japanese, Korean, and Chinese versions in 2008. He is an emeritus professor of Australian National University. The present paper is an expanded version of his article published in Japanese in <\/em>Shukan kinyobi on 5 March 2010.<\/em><\/p>\n Recommended citation: Gavan McCormack, “The Travails of a Client State:\u00a0An Okinawan Angle on the 50th Anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10-3-10, March 8, 2010.<\/em><\/p>\n Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n [1] In English as The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude<\/em>, translated by Harry Kurz and with an introduction by Murray Rothbard, Montr\u00e8al\/New York\/London: Black Rose Books, 1997. Web version here<\/a>. I am indebted to Nishitani Osamu (see note 5) for drawing my attention to de la Bo\u00e9tie.<\/p>\n [2] Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya did set up an \u201cExperts\u201d committee to investigate the so-called \u201cSecret Agreements\u201d between US and Japanese governments on nuclear and other matters and report back during 2010, but it was of limited focus, precipitated by the common knowledge that such documents existed in the US archives and a series of public statements by former senior officials testifying to their existence. Early reports from Tokyo suggest that no such documents had been found, which raised the possibility they had been deliberately destroyed.<\/p>\n [3] Client State: Japan in the American Embrace<\/em>, New York, Verso, 2007. Expanded Japanese edition as Zokkoku \u2013 Amerika no hoyo to Ajia de no koritsu<\/em>, Tokyo, Gaifusha, 2008.<\/p>\n [4] Terashima Jitsuro, \u201cZuno no ressun, Tokubetsu hen, (94), Joshiki ni kaeru ishi to koso \u2013 Nichibei domei no saikochiku ni mukete,\u201d Sekai<\/em>, February 2010, 118-125. Terashima refers to Japanese intellectuals by the term, \u201cdo-gan\u201d (literally \u201cslave face\u201d, a term he invents based on his reading of a savagely satirical early 20th century Chinese story by Lu Hsun).<\/p>\n [5]. Nishitani Osamu, \u201c\u2019Jihatsuteki reiju\u2019 o koeyo \u2013 jiritsuteki seiji e no ippo,\u201d Sekai, February 2010: pp. 134-140, at p. 136.<\/p>\n [6] Clare Short, formerly International Development Secretary, \u201cClare Short: Blair misled us and took UK into an illegal war,\u201d The Guardian<\/em>, 2 February 2010.<\/p>\n [7] Boei mondai kondankai, \u201cNihon no anzen hosho to boeiryoku no arikata \u2013 21 seiki e mukete no tenbo,\u201d (commonly known as the \u201cHiguchi Report\u201d after its chair, Higuchi Kotaro), presented to Prime Minister Murayama in August 1994.<\/p>\n [8] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, \u201cThe U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia right through 2020,\u201d Washington, CSIS, February 2007.<\/p>\n [9] For details, see my Client State<\/em>, passim.<\/p>\n [10] \u201cThe Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama,\u201d<\/a> The Asia-Pacific Journal, 16 November 2009.<\/p>\n [11] \u201cWhy Build a New Base on Okinawa When the Marines are Relocating to Guam?: Okinawa Mayor Challenges Japan and the US.\u201d<\/a> See also Iha Yoichi, interviewed in \u201cFutenma isetsu to Henoko shin kichi wa kankei nai,\u201d Shukan kinyobi<\/em>, 15 January 2010, pp. 28-9.<\/p>\n [12] Yanagisawa Kyoji (special researcher and former Director of National Institute for Defense Studies), \u201cFutenma no kakushin \u2013kaiheitai no yokushiryoku o kensho seyo,\u201d Asahi shimbun<\/em>, 28 January 2010.<\/p>\n [13] \u201cSanto raigetsu isetsusaki oteishi,\u201d Okinawa Times<\/em>, 29 December 2009.<\/p>\n [14] Quoted in \u201cKiki aoru dake de wa nasakenai,\u201d editorial, Ryukyu shimpo<\/em>, 7 December 2009. For a fascinating transcript of the meeting, see Medoruma Shun\u2019s blog, \u201cUminari no hitobito,\u201d \u201cOkada gaisho to \u2018shimin to no daiwa shukai\u2019, zenmen kokai,\u201d in 7 parts, beginning here<\/a>.<\/p>\nThe Travails of a Client State:\u00a0An Okinawan Angle on the 50th Anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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