

**STRENGTHENING U.S. GLOBAL  
DEFENSE POSTURE**

**SEPTEMBER 2004**

**REPORT TO CONGRESS**



September 17, 2004

## ***FOREWORD***

In 2001, at the President's request, the Secretary of Defense began a broad-based effort to transform the Defense Department for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. As part of that transformation, the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive, strategy-based review of U.S. global defense posture – the size, location, types, and capabilities of our forward military forces. Once completed, the changes stemming from the review will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since our current posture was cemented at the end of World War II and the Korean War. Combined with ongoing Service initiatives, these changes will position U.S. forces to better meet 21<sup>st</sup>-Century challenges – particularly to conduct the Global War on Terrorism – and help ease the burden of the post-9/11 operational tempo on members of the Armed Forces and their families.

Since the United States became a global power at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it has changed its forward posture as strategic circumstances have evolved: from bases for administering new overseas territories, to post-World War II occupation duties, and then to a Cold War containment posture. Today, fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is again time to change our posture to fit the strategic realities of our era: an uncertain strategic environment dominated by the nexus of terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

This report, prepared with support from General Richard Myers, General Peter Pace, the Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the Department of State, provides a comprehensive update on the global defense posture review. It follows President Bush's announcement on August 16, 2004 highlighting key aspects of our planned posture changes.

Changes to our global posture will improve our ability to meet our alliance commitments while making our alliances more affordable and sustainable. The Secretaries of State and Defense will continue to conduct diplomatic discussions with U.S. allies and security partners, and where appropriate will initiate negotiations designed to secure formal agreements with host nations. In all cases, we will seek flexible arrangements, both legal and logistical, to maximize the usability and effectiveness of our forces.

Global defense posture changes will have direct implications for the forthcoming round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC): some personnel and assets will return to the United States; others will move to forward U.S. locations or to host nations. Both efforts – global posture changes and BRAC – are critical components of President Bush's defense transformation agenda. Therefore, even though global posture changes will be implemented over several

years and will continue to be adjusted as strategic circumstances change, the Defense Department will incorporate its projected overseas posture changes into the BRAC 2005 process.

The Administration appreciates Congress's vision and support as we seek to implement necessary, far-reaching, and enduring changes to strengthen America's global defense posture while providing our service members and their families with more predictability and stability over their military careers. Congress is a full partner in the consultative process, and we look forward to continuing our joint work on behalf of the Nation and our Armed Forces.

Douglas J. Feith  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

# **REPORT TO CONGRESS: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture**

*“Today I announce a new plan for deploying America’s armed forces...The new plan will help us fight and win the wars of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It will strengthen our alliances around the world while we build new partnerships to better preserve the peace.”*

*President George W. Bush  
August 16, 2004*

## **I. Introduction**

The global defense posture of the United States comprises the size, location, types, and capabilities of its forward military forces. It constitutes a fundamental element of our ability to project power and undertake military actions beyond our borders. Together with our overall military force structure, our global defense posture enables the United States to assure allies, dissuade potential challengers, deter our enemies, and defeat aggression if necessary.

The forward presence of military forces at overseas locations has played an important role in supporting U.S. strategic interests for well over a century. Forward-deployed forces provide the basic building blocks with which to project military power in crises and strengthen U.S. military access.

Beyond their military significance, forward forces serve to:

- Strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy;
- Demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of America’s friends and allies; and
- Demonstrate to any potential challengers U.S. resolve to deter aggression and meet our commitments.

## **II. Background**

### *Historical Perspective*

At the conclusion of the Korean War, U.S. forces were stationed overseas in a posture that would remain relatively unchanged throughout the Cold War. In

Europe, ground, air, and naval forces were stationed in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from Iceland in the northwest to Turkey in the southeast. In the Pacific region, forces were stationed in Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. These forward forces in Europe and Asia were primarily designed to fight in place – potent in defensive operations close to garrison, but difficult to deploy outside of their theater of stationing.

The end of the Cold War, along with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, dramatically altered the security landscape that had shaped our forward defense posture. As a result, during the first half of the 1990s, the United States closed or turned over to host governments about 60 percent of its overseas military installations, and returned nearly 300,000 military personnel to the United States – the largest component being Army personnel from Europe, primarily Germany. Also, at the request of host governments, during the 1990s the United States closed large military facilities in the Philippines, Spain, and Panama.

Although dramatically reduced, forward-stationed U.S. military forces remained concentrated in Cold War theaters – western Europe and northeast Asia. Yet, our military forces were operating in very different locations: the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia, among others. These frequent and ongoing deployments underscored the fact that *the United States can no longer expect our forward forces to fight in place*; rather, for most forward-stationed U.S. forces, their purpose is to undertake operations on short notice by deploying rapidly into near or distant theaters.

Our legacy posture combined with new operating patterns also created undue hardships on both our military forces and their families. Our forward forces, particularly in Europe, frequently have endured “double separations”: troops are deployed to other theaters outside of Europe, while their family members are far from their extended families back in the United States.

### ***Reasons for the Review***

This change in our forces’ operating patterns – from static defenses to frequent expeditionary operations – combined with advances in military capabilities, an increasingly uncertain global strategic environment, and stresses on the force, led President George W. Bush to conclude that a comprehensive review of U.S. global defense posture was needed.

The review had its roots in the 2001 *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. U.S. Defense Strategy called for moving toward a capabilities-based approach to planning, and away from the decades-long practice of threat-based planning, in

recognition of the fact that we cannot know exactly where or when we will be called on to fight.

Then, in 2002, the new National Security Strategy of the United States provided further direction for the review:

*“To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”*

Other factors pointed to the need to review our worldwide deployment of military capabilities. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States clarified our understanding of the key security challenges that our country will face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Traditional, state-based military challenges – for which our current posture is optimized – will remain, but a broader range of security challenges has emerged, including:

- The nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- Ungoverned states and under-governed areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists and other transnational threats; and
- Potential adversaries’ adoption of asymmetric approaches – including irregular warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and advanced, disruptive, technological challenges – designed to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.

Military effectiveness in an age of terrorism and asymmetric warfare is no longer measured simply by the industrial-age concept of mass, but rather by more advanced concepts like speed, stealth, reach, knowledge, precision, and lethality. So too should our posture place less emphasis on numbers of forward forces and instead emphasize capabilities and effects that can be brought to bear rapidly.

Operational realities were also a critical factor. Forward deployed does not necessarily mean optimally deployed. For example, heavy divisions in Europe may be closer to the Persian Gulf region than units in the U.S., but as Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, their movement by sea requires a circuitous route via the Baltic and North Seas, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean. Therefore Europe’s proximity provides no particularly significant time advantage for movement of such heavy forces compared to movement from the United States.

Additionally, we gave consideration to the irritants that our overseas military facilities can cause, particularly where such facilities are near host-nation population centers and valued land holdings. Wherever possible we looked to make posture changes that lessen the real and perceived burdens of such situations. Ultimately, these changes should help us to strengthen our alliances and improve our ability to interact with the host nation.

Finally, stresses on our military forces and their families dictated that we review our posture globally. Accompanied tours that were designed in an era of static deployments have become more of a hardship for families as service members deploy more frequently from their forward stations. Accompanying dependents – many unable to work in the local economy due to host-nation restrictions – more often find themselves in a state of double separation: separated both from the service member and from their loved ones and extended support networks back in the United States. The planned changes to our posture directly support Service initiatives – such as the Army’s modularity and unit rotation concepts, the Navy’s Fleet Response Concept, and the Air Force’s ongoing force management improvements – designed to facilitate personnel management, provide predictability in scheduling, and offer more stability at home.

### ***Defining Global Posture***

U.S. global defense posture encompasses more than simply forward bases and personnel. It includes a cross-section of relationships, activities, facilities, legal arrangements, and global sourcing and surge. Taken together, these five elements of global defense posture support our security cooperation efforts and, when needed, enable prompt global military action.

#### Relationships

Our ability to act around the world is supported by key security **relationships** with allies and partners. These relationships involve interactions at all levels – from heads of state to the students studying together in the schoolhouses that we and our allies provide. Changes in global posture seek both to strengthen our existing relationships and to help cultivate new relationships founded upon common security interests. We seek strengthened and new relationships to harmonize views on the nature of the security challenges we confront and to provide a solid basis for enhancing allied and partner military capabilities in critical areas, such as counter-terrorism.

#### Activities

Our posture includes the full range of security cooperation **activities** we pursue with our allies and partners. These activities include training, exercises, and operations. They

involve small units working together in a wide range of capacities along with major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations. They involve both the “nuts and bolts” of providing support to ongoing operations as well as the force protection that we and our allies provide to each other. Our military activities with our allies and partners increasingly will be focused on preparing our forces for operations that may occur in remote, austere areas.

### Facilities

Our posture includes the **facilities** where our forces live, train, and operate. It also includes the prepositioned equipment and materiel that permits the deployment and sustainment of forces in potentially distant theaters of operation. U.S. and host-nation facilities enable our combined activities and therefore help sustain our long-term relationships. In our future posture we will seek to optimize the locations, use, and diversity of our facilities, while removing irritants in the relationship between the United States and the host nation.

### Legal Arrangements

A critical component of our global defense posture is the set of bilateral and multilateral **legal arrangements** pertaining to our military personnel and activities worldwide. These arrangements constitute the formal framework for our military presence, access, and activities in other sovereign countries. They set forth the rights and obligations of the parties, set the terms for military access and activities, and provide protections for U.S. personnel. Our planned posture changes will be built on a foundation of legal arrangements that enable the necessary flexibility and freedom of action to meet 21st-century security challenges.

### Global Sourcing and Surge

A final element of our global defense posture will be a global force management system that should enable the Department of Defense to **surge** the most ready, best positioned capabilities on a global basis – across theaters – to meet combatant commanders' needs. While regional combatant commanders will continue to have assigned forces that are, in general, based in their area of responsibility, the new force management system seeks to ensure national decision-makers are given **global sourcing** recommendations to address combatant commander requests, with a clear calculation of associated risks.

## ***Key Themes for Changing Global Defense Posture***

Our plans to change our global defense posture have been guided by six principal strategic considerations:

- We seek to *expand allied roles, build new partnerships, and encourage transformation* – both in allied military forces’ capabilities and in allies’ ability to assume broader global roles and responsibilities. Changes in our global posture will help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, doctrines and strategies. Together we will explore ways in which we can transform our military capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor the physical U.S. “footprint” to suit local conditions. Our goal is to reduce friction with host nations, the kind that results from accidents and other problems related to local sensitivities.
- The United States seeks to *create greater operational flexibility to contend with uncertainty* by emphasizing agility and not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations for particular scenarios. In the Cold War we believed we knew where our forces would fight. Now, we need to plan and posture our capabilities to address a broader range of contingencies.
- We seek to *focus and act both within and across various regions* of the world. In the past, we focused our planning on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to those regions. Today’s broader challenges require global strategies and actions in conjunction with our regional planning, along with an ability to manage forces on a global basis and project power across so-called “seams.”
- We seek to *develop rapidly deployable capabilities* by planning and operating from the premise that forces will not likely fight in place. Legal arrangements for access and support arrangements will be made flexible enough to ensure the rapid and effective flow of U.S. capabilities into, through, and from foreign theaters of operations.
- The United States and its allies and partners need an updated measure of merit: effective *military capabilities, not numbers* of personnel and platforms, are what create decisive military effects and will enable the United States to execute its security commitments globally.
- Finally, as President Bush has emphasized, the new posture will have a *positive effect on our military forces and families*. Rotations of our military forces and capabilities into forward areas will seek balance by providing more stability at home, with fewer overseas moves and less disruption for families.

### **III. Changes to Posture**

#### ***Broad Overview of Proposals***

A network of traditional and new facilities, combined with improved flexibility in our legal arrangements to permit the rapid use of our forward forces, will continue to provide the U.S. with an unmatched ability to assure our allies, deter our enemies, and conduct military missions worldwide.

The changes described below, and in further detail in this report's classified annex, form the baseline for our future global posture. As strategic circumstances change, as our military capabilities evolve, and as new mission areas (e.g., missile defense) are further developed, our global force posture will continue to mature.

#### ***Definitions***

With our new posture, we will define our facilities in the following manner:

##### Main Operating Base (MOB)

Main operating bases, with permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure, will be characterized by command and control structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures. Examples include: Ramstein Air Base (Germany), Kadena Air Base (Okinawa, Japan), and Camp Humphreys (Korea).

##### Forward Operating Site (FOS)

Forward operating site will be an expandable "warm facilities" maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. FOSs will support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. Examples include: the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras.

##### Cooperative Security Location (CSL)

Cooperative security locations will be facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. Instead they will be maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support. CSLs will provide contingency access and be a focal point

for security cooperation activities. A current example of a CSL is in Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and fuel contracting arrangements, and which served as a staging area for the 2003 peace support operation in Liberia.

## ***Region-By-Region Synopsis***

### Europe

The United States will continue to work together with our NATO allies to face common global challenges. The transformation of our military presence in Europe will facilitate the development of capabilities among our NATO allies and partners to address such challenges.

Peace in Europe is no longer threatened by a large-scale conventional force positioned to move into the continent. Thus there is no longer a strategic need for heavy maneuver forces as the central element of U.S. defense posture in Europe. A transformed posture – one that supports NATO’s own transformation goals – requires forward forces that are rapidly deployable for early entry into conflict both within and beyond Europe. Such forces will continue to train alongside other NATO forces to improve interoperability for 21<sup>st</sup>-century military operations.

Our future posture in Europe, therefore, will be characterized by lighter, more deployable ground capabilities (e.g., Stryker and airborne forces). Such ground forces will have a leaner command and support structure than they have today. They will be enabled by our existing advanced training facilities (such as in Grafenwoehr, Germany), as well as high-capacity mobility infrastructure (e.g., in Ramstein, Germany). Special Forces will play an increasingly important role in our future European posture. They will be re-positioned in the theater for training and operational efficiencies, and for ease of movement both within and outside of Europe. Our naval and air capabilities in the theater will remain among the best in the world and will enable rapid movement of forces into, through, and from Europe. They, too, will be supported by a leaner command structure.

With these changes, the United States will strengthen its deployable military capabilities in Europe – and with these capabilities seek to set the new standard for excellence in training and operating with our allies and partners.

We will ensure that any changes in our European posture will be consistent with our Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty obligations and NATO policy statements and political commitments.

## Asia-Pacific

In the Asia-Pacific region, we seek to improve our ability to meet our alliance commitments by strengthening our deterrent against threats such as that posed by North Korea, while helping our allies strengthen their own military capabilities. In this region – in light of the vast distances that military forces must traverse in crises – this means increasing our ability to project military forces rapidly and at long ranges, both to the region and within it. We also plan to strengthen our posture to conduct operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Even as we look to implement such changes, we also seek to reduce the number of U.S. military forces in host nations where those forces abut large, urban populations. We will strengthen our relationships by reducing the frictions -- accidents, incidents, etc. -- associated with normal military activities amidst civilian societies.

Our current ground, air, and naval access throughout the Asia-Pacific region serve as a basis for a longer-term presence that will be better structured for more effective regional and global action. Where appropriate, our facilities and headquarters will be consolidated for more streamlined command and control and increased jointness. We seek to establish a network of FOSs and CSLs to support the Global War on Terrorism and to provide multiple avenues of access for contingency operations. Such facilities also will serve to expand US and host-nation training opportunities, helping our partners build their own capacity in areas such as counter-terrorism. Finally, we seek to take advantage of emerging opportunities with allies and security partners who favor expanded practical relationships in support of our global posture goals.

On the Korean peninsula, our planned enhancements and realignments are intended to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the combined defense of the Republic of Korea. Stationed forces will relocate away from the increasing congestion and sprawl of the greater Seoul area and will be consolidated into two major hubs in the central and southern sections of the country. Rotational and rapidly deployable combat capabilities such as Stryker units and air expeditionary forces will complement these permanently stationed units. We seek to retain a robust prepositioned equipment capability in Korea to support rapid reinforcement. Finally, our broader improvements to other regional military forces, such as the forward deployment of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities and long-range strike assets, will increase both our deterrent effect and capacity for rapid response.

## Gulf and Middle East

We are seeking continued cooperation with our partners in the Gulf and Middle Eastern region in the fight against terrorism.

Cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom provide us with a solid basis for long-term, cooperative relationships in this region. We seek to maintain or upgrade, and in some cases establish, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations for rotational and contingency purposes, along with strategically placed prepositioned equipment and forward command and control elements. Additionally, we continue to identify advanced training opportunities with our regional partners for capacity building in areas such as counter-terrorism and for broader military interoperability. In this way we seek to maintain a presence – thereby assuring our allies and partners – without the kind of heavy footprint that abrades on regional sensitivities.

We desire close sustained security relationships with Afghanistan and Iraq that enable us to continue to play a positive role in their rebuilding efforts and in regional security broadly. As with all such relationships, any decision on future U.S. military posture is a sovereign choice for their people and governments.

#### Africa and Western Hemisphere

Our aim in Africa and the Western Hemisphere is to facilitate practical security cooperation activities and improved access, without creation of new bases or permanent military presence.

Ungoverned and under-governed areas in vast swaths of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa can serve as breeding grounds not just for domestic terrorists, but also international terrorists and other transnational threats that increasingly find their “home bases” disappearing in other regions. We therefore seek an array of cooperative security locations in these regions for contingency access into remote areas. Such CSLs will not require a permanent combat presence. They will be focal points for combined training with host nations and other allies and partners, and they will have the capacity to expand and contract based on operational needs.

#### Net changes

Over the next ten years, as a result of the changes outlined above, up to 70,000 military personnel are planned to return to the United States, along with approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees. Additionally, there will be a net reduction of approximately 35% of the number of sites – bases, installations, and facilities – that the Department of Defense maintains overseas. The Department maintains approximately 850 such sites overseas today; once posture changes have been made over the course of the next 10 years, the resulting figure will be closer to 550 sites.

## **V. Consultations**

## *The Diplomatic Process*

On November 25, 2003, President Bush announced that the United States would intensify consultations with friends, allies, and partners overseas regarding our review of global defense posture. This was the beginning of a renewed consultative process with dozens of allies and partners on five continents. Since the President's announcement, cabinet-level officials (Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell) and other senior officials from the Departments of State (Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, Under Secretary Mark Grossman, and Assistant Secretary Lincoln Bloomfield) and Defense (Under Secretary Douglas Feith and Deputy Assistant Secretary Andrew Hoehn) have traveled widely to pursue substantive discussions on our posture changes.

As we entered into these consultations, we faced a variety of questions from our allies and partners. The extensive U.S. diplomatic efforts undertaken through many subsequent senior-level consultations at NATO and in key European and Asian capitals answered the key questions:

- Allies expressed appreciation for our timely consultations and our respect for their interests and sensitivities, along with the sensitivities of key third parties (like Russia and China).
- They understood and shared our general perception of the need to update our force posture globally to meet 21<sup>st</sup>-century security challenges. In this respect, many U.S. ideas aligned closely with the thinking of our allies.
- They also appreciated the opportunity to suggest adjustments to U.S. proposals, and our readiness to work with them to provide time to deal with local impacts.

Diplomatic reactions in the wake of President Bush's August 16, 2004 announcement on global posture underscored the importance of our consultative effort, as our global posture themes were in large measure understood and accepted.

Discussions with allies and partners will be an ongoing process. With some countries, we are ready to engage on the specific details of implementing changes; with others, we seek negotiations on legal arrangements; and with others,

additional consultations are still required prior to entering into negotiations.

*Since November 2003, the Departments of State and Defense have held senior-level consultations on global defense posture at NATO and in the capitals of the following allies, partners, and interested parties:*

Australia	Italy	Spain
Azerbaijan	Japan	Singapore
Bulgaria	Korea	Thailand
China	Philippines	Turkey
France	Poland	U.K.
Germany	Romania	Uzbekistan
Iceland	Russia	

*The United States has also held Ambassadorial-level consultations with over 30 countries on five continents.*

An important facet of our global posture is our system of legal arrangements with allies and partners. With some countries we will need new legal arrangements, and with others we may need to update existing arrangements. While mindful of sovereignty and country-specific concerns, legal arrangements that enable our global posture should maximize our ability to:

- Conduct training in host nations;
- Deploy U.S. forces wherever and whenever they are needed; and
- Support deployed forces around the world.

In addition, legal arrangements seek to encourage responsibility-sharing between the U.S. and our partners – not just regarding resources, but also regarding operational roles – as well as provide sufficient legal protections for our personnel. The kinds of legal protections we consider to be important include status of forces agreements and so-called Article 98 agreements that relate to the International Criminal Court.

### ***Interactions with Congress***

Since summer 2003, the Departments of Defense and State have had regular discussions with and provided briefings to Congress at all levels, from Committee leadership to individual Members to staff.

- Secretary Donald Rumsfeld briefed the leaders of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith testified before the House Armed Services Committee in June 2004; additional testimony by senior DoD civilian and military officials is anticipated in September 2004.
- Based on Congressional requests, Defense and State Department officials have provided an extensive set of briefings to individual members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as staff from the Armed Services, Foreign Relations/International Relations, and Appropriations Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

These interactions have provided important contributions to the review. The role of Congress in providing necessary funding for and oversight to our posture changes will be instrumental to our success in restructuring our overseas military

capabilities. We look forward to continuing our interactions with Congress as we move forward with our plans.

## **V. Global Posture and BRAC**

The Global Defense Posture Review and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round scheduled for 2005 are both key components of the President's defense transformation agenda. They are distinct yet interdependent processes, and they both will be critical instruments for providing greater stability in the lives of service members and their families. Together, they will help provide more predictability in assignments and rotations.

Decisions on global posture will help inform the decisions for BRAC 2005. The Department seeks to enable the domestic implications of the global posture review – with forces and personnel either returning to, moving within, or moving forward from U.S. territory – to be accounted for within the BRAC decision-making process. Conversely, the BRAC process will help align the domestic infrastructure for forces that are returning to or departing from U.S. territory.

Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC rounds, the U.S. will retain a domestic infrastructure sufficient to provide for difficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge needs and to accommodate a significant reconstitution of the force as necessary, including all forces based within and outside the United States.

## **VI. Conclusion**

While the security environment in which the U.S. military operates has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the need for the United States to maintain a forward defense posture to protect and promote our Nation's interests has not changed. Nevertheless, new security challenges and changing operational needs demand new approaches and measures. The planned global defense posture changes are an important response to these demands. By building upon our long-standing alliances, enhancing our other security relationships, and transforming how we and our partners conduct our military activities, the United States is working with our international partners to create new ways to strengthen international security and defend our nation.

Our comprehensive changes to global posture will support parallel efforts by the Services to relieve stresses on our forces and their families. A rationalized posture with a broader base of CONUS-stationed forces will provide a wider range of options to our Services for more effective force management, and decrease the "double separations" that now frequently challenge our forward-stationed military families.

The plan presented here represents the Administration's goals for a strengthened posture. We expect that there will be adjustments as we enter into negotiations with host nations. Additionally, the United States will continue to calibrate its overseas presence both as strategic circumstances change and as our relationships evolve with friends and allies.

With the global defense posture changes President Bush is proposing, and with the support of Congress, the United States will reinforce our alliances, retain the world's premier fighting force, and make the world safer for the coming generation.