New party sweeps elections in Japan – What does it mean?

In a recent election, Japanese voters ousted the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and brought to power what had been the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This is the first time that the LDP has not ruled, and it raises many questions about the prospects for the future of Japan, including the future of U.S. military bases in Japan and Okinawa.

The People’s Plan Japonesia website, a leading English Language Japanese political journal, carried an preliminary analysis of the election results by Muto Ichiyo, a respected political watcher. The article was prompted by an email from an Indian colleague:

Dear Muto san and friends in Japan, Suddenly, with the election results in Japan, there is a flood of memory about all you friends. The results look pretty unprecedented sitting here in India. But one has no idea whether it comes anywhere close to what you all have been struggling for all these years?! Or whether one should even hope for any changes; even mild. If anyone has written anything on it in English, or has the time to pen a small paragraph, it would really help to reconnect again. In admiration and with regards,

Vinod Raina Delhi, India September 1 2009

In response Muto writes:

Dear Vinod, I thank you for prompting me to write on it. The August 30 general election here has brought on the decisive downfall of the Liberal Democratic Party, ushering in a new dynamics in Japanese politics…

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for the first time tumbled down from its position of power. And this occurred because an overwhelming majority of Japanese voters felt enough is enough after a half-century of one-party rule by the LDP. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the major opposition party, saw its Lower House force explode from 115 to 308 seats, and the LDP’s strength shrank from 300 to 119. The New Komei Party, LDP’s coalition partner, lost all its seats from single seat constituencies, its total seats cut from 31 to 21.

While describing the election as “major change, even a drastic change”, Muto tempers his prognosis that “political dynamism which the election ushered in has created new possibilities as well as new dangers.”

Muto writes that “the major significance of the 2009 August election is that this [political] machinery [of the LDP and its power] has fallen apart.”   The radical neoliberal economic policies of the Koizumi administration and the resulting social and economic devastation of the poor, working, and middle classes helped to precipitate this political upheaval:  ““Market fundamentalism” and “neoliberal policies” had become negative symbols even in the mainstream media.”

Furthermore, two subsequent Prime Ministers from the LDP, including the ultra-right wing Shinzo Abe, were forced to resign.

While the DPJ is not a “left”party by any means, it appears that the new government is sincerely trying to break up the bureaucracy and its embedded interest groups that has dictated Japanese politics during the LDP era.   The new government has made some bold statements critical of the present U.S. – Japan military and security arrangement, but it remains to be seen whether it will aggressively pursue changes to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or change the base realignment underway in Okinawa.  On this Muto writes:

One major question to be asked is if the new government is changing the Japan-U.S. security relations in meaningful ways. This is the touchstone of the new government’s will to change. In the post-Cold War period, Japan was brought into an ever-tighter U.S. military embrace than at the height of the Cold War as I discussed in detail in past issues of the Japonesia Review. Especially during the Bush period, the U.S. military transformation program turned Japan into a cog in the U.S. global military apparatus, even institutionally subjecting Japanese military forces to American command. Confronting persistent resistance from local people, the Japanese and U.S. governments were dead-set on imposing a new military base on Okinawa. In the 2009 Manifesto, the DPJ states that “in order to create a close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship, we will propose amending the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces agreement, and will consider revising the planned realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, as well as reviewing the nature of U.S. bases in Japan.” (translation by the Japan Times) You may think this is a bold statement defying the American dominance. But I am not sure whether the DPJ government is going to seriously negotiate this matter with Washington.

There is an episode that may be prognostic. When negotiating terms of its coalition with the Social Democratic Party, then-DPJ Secretary General Okada Katsuya was reluctant to mention renegotiation of the Status of Forces agreement in the coalition accord. SDP Chair Fukushima Mizuho adamantly insisted on this point, and Okada only grudgingly and patronizingly agreed to include in the accord the exact phrase that had been printed and widely publicized in the party Manifesto. The negotiations dragged on and on because Okada said he did not want to provoke US President Obama. Okada was subsequently appointed Foreign Minister. Is this Foreign Minister going to negotiate with Washington, or just beg?

Muto points out a number of key leaders in the DPJ that raise concerns, including Ozawa Ichiro:

The recognized strongest man of the party, Ozawa Ichiro, former secretary general of the LDP, and now appointed Secretary General of the DPJ, is one of the major strategists who advocated “Japan as an ordinary country.” His scenario of turning Japan into a country having fully legitimate military forces through the revision of constitution is shared by all conservative politicians.

He sums up that:

…there is an alarming gap between what one says and what one is, a gap that unsettles, and even scares, me. For without principles, one can change from one to the other extreme without qualms. That is why I said that this change can entail dangers as well as possibilities.

The DPJ, in order to be consistent, need to establish principled positions at least on the following issues, (1) the military alliance with the United States, (2) self-critical view of history, (3) neoliberal capitalism, and (4) the constitution. The party says a bit of something on each of these, but is articulate on none.

In conclusion, Muto sees hope coming from the grassroots movements:

This means that now is the time when social movements working on different fronts – labor, women, peace, welfare, environment, agriculture – should get together to establish their common principled positions and visions of Japanese society. That is to tell the DPJ government that we are here and will stay here until you take principled positions on crucial matters and act accordingly. This does include lobbying activities but the main approach is not lobbying but the influence we exert on the DPJ government through our uncompromising presence in the midst of society. Such pressure from below may split the party, triggering a process of reconsolidation of parliamentary political forces toward a sounder, more principled disposition of political forces, a welcome outcome benefiting our march forward.

The full article can be read here:  http://www.ppjaponesia.org/modules/tinycontent/index.php?id=6

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