In this article, heavily slanted in favor of the U.S.-Japan military base agreement, Richard P. Lawless, former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Department of Defense in charge of Asia-Pacific affairs, essentially threatened that if Japan blocks the plan to move a marine air base to Henoko in Okinawa, the U.S. will pack up its toys, or in this case “the entire Marine presence and its deterrence value” and leave.   This would probably be cheered by many of the people burdened with the impacts of U.S. military bases in Japan. However, such a move could be very bad for Guam or Hawai’i, unless it entailed the overall reduction in forces and bases in the Pacific.  John Feffer’s article in Tom Dispatch lays out a good analysis of the flawed rationale for and interests behind the marines presence in Japan and Okinawa.

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http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003040361.html

U.S. official: Japan could lose entire Marine presence if Henoko plan scrapped

By YOICHI KATO, Asahi Shimbun Senior Staff Writer

2010/03/05

If the Hatoyama administration fails to honor its agreement to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa to Nago’s Henoko district in the prefecture, Japan runs the risk of losing the entire Marine presence and its deterrence value, Richard P. Lawless, former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Department of Defense in charge of Asia-Pacific affairs, said in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun.

Lawless said the Japanese government seems intent on playing domestic politics and doesn’t fully understand the magnitude of the issue.

Lawless, who was involved in the negotiations to reach the 2006 Henoko agreement, also rejected the idea of moving Futenma functions to Camp Schwab, also in Okinawa Prefecture.

He said there is no plan B to the Henoko agreement. And any unacceptable alternative would not only seriously affect the U.S. capability to defend Japan, but could change the security structure of Asia.

In a worst case scenario, Japan could find itself on its own with potentially unfriendly nations nearby, Lawless said.

The following are excerpts of the interview.

Question: First, can you tell me about Schwab-Hilly option–building a runway in the hilly part of northwestern Camp Schwab–for the Futenma relocation plan?

As of now, Schwab-Hilly seems to be the most likely conclusion the research committee will reach next week. We understand that Washington, including you who represented the U.S. government, refused that option back in 2005.

What do you think of the Schwab-Hilly option now? And why did the U.S. government reject that option in 2005?

Answer: Yes. I do want to talk about that. But first I would like to mention the deep disappointment that I think the U.S. government holds over this issue. I am not a U.S. government spokesman, but I do have a keen sense that this disappointment is deep and wide in our government.

The disappointment is that this entire discussion over Futenma’s new location seems to be driven, almost exclusively, by Japanese domestic politics. Our hope from the very beginning was that the framework for this important decision would be, should be, “What is best for the security of Japan?”

Not what is best just for the alliance, but, “What is best for the security of Japan and, therefore, the alliance?” That key consideration should inform and frame every aspect of this decision.

That has not happened. Rather, the discussion and the decision has been allowed by the DPJ leadership to spiral downward into a swamp that is a mixture of mindless revenge directed at the former LDP administration, mixed with internal Minshuto (DPJ) political maneuvering, a wandering dynamic between Minshuto and various Okinawa political groups, all overlaid by ruling coalition calculations keyed to the July Upper House election.

We understand that the concerns of the Okinawa people should be taken into consideration, and we tried to do this at the end of the day. (But) the overriding concern and consideration must be the national security of Japan, and this is not happening. This is the disappointment, and the element that causes the U.S. to lose confidence and trust in the relationship.

Regarding the so-called Schwab Hilly option, if such is indeed the the solution so proposed by Prime Minister Hatoyama, it will arrive as a great disappointment to the United States. Because such a decision on the Japan side would directly impact the ability of the United States to sustain the capabilities to the alliance which we have promised.

We examined the Schwab Hilly option in great detail in the 2002-2005 period. It was jointly agreed, by both sides, that this was not a practical solution and would not work from either an operational or practical standpoint. The suggested 500-meter helicopter pad was, therefore, a nonstarter from day one.

First, such a facility would not give us the capability we needed to have with the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). Futenma is not just a helicopter pad–it is an air facility capable of handling a variety of aircraft, supporting a number of missions, in peacetime and in wartime. This facility must provide for contingency air operations in time of war or in time of heightened tensions. A 500-meter helicopter pad does not do that.

So from a contingency or from a capability standpoint, it is completely inadequate.

Secondly, from the standpoint of local impact within Okinawa, the Japan Defense Agency at the time regarded this as a high-risk approach because they thought it would be completely unacceptable to the local people.

There were numerous issues related to air safety, related to operations, noise and other issues, to the degree that the Japan side thought that this would make for a problematic offer, or solution, even in the case that we accepted it, from a capabilities point of view–which we did not.

So due consideration was given to Schwab-Hilly. For many good reasons it was decided almost at the outset that this was a completely inadequate and probably unachievable solution.

Q: Has the situation changed since then?

A: Actually, not only has the situation not changed, it has become even worse, because we still need the same capabilities on Okinawa to provide the real capabilities we need to execute our mission. If Japan has decided, on its own, that the alliance does not need these capabilities, Japan needs to tell us this new reality and explain what it expects us to do, and how Japan expects us to deliver on our obligations to the alliance.

One of our obligations is to retain operational readiness, thereby maintaining the credibility of our real commitments. As you know, we must complete the re-equipping of our Marine airlift squadrons, replacing the current model, which have served for several decades, with the MV-22 Osprey. This has been planned for some time, was a consideration in the planning for the Henoko facility, and we must execute this replacement in the near future.

Our operational requirements–the capability that we need to have in place to deliver on our obligations to the alliance–are satisfied by the current solution, the so-called Henoko solution. And this same solution will provide for future requirements to keep the alliance strong, relevant and credible.

The same requirements will absolutely not be satisfied by the so-called Schwab-Hilly.

On the local relationship side, I think the Hatoyama government has made it extremely difficult to deal with the Okinawa population and the local situation. So we have seen, in recent weeks, the reaction of the people to suggestions to move Futenma into the middle of Camp Schwab, suggestions made by both, I believe, Mr. Okada, and I believe, by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano.

These suggestions or “ad balloons” have met with extremely negative reactions from the Okinawa people.

So we think it’s a nonstarter, I would say, from the standpoint of capabilities that we need to have for the alliance, and presents us all with an even more difficult scenario related to the local political situation.

Q: Is it possible to put a 1,500-meter runway in the Schwab-Hilly location? And if that’s possible, would it satisfy the operational requirements?

A: It is very difficult for me to answer that question because I don’t believe such a possibility was ever seriously considered and because it was regarded as being too difficult, too costly and too problematic politically.

Q: Do you think the Henoko option, the Roadmap Agreement, is still viable and feasible?

A: The dilemma that the United States government has is that we have a bilateral agreement between our two nations, an agreement that underlies and supports an alliance transformation, the basic capabilities of that alliance and a badly needed and long-overdue posture realignment.

Unless the Japanese government formally notifies us in May, as Prime Minister Hatoyama has promised, that they are unwilling and unable to fulfill that agreement, we continue to live with the letter and the spirit of the agreement, and reasonably expect Japan to execute on the commitments it has made.

So everything that we’re doing in Japan, all of our realignment, the movement to Guam, all of the commitments which we made to the people of Okinawa, including Futenma closure and expanded land return, is conditional upon the Henoko solution. Until and unless the government of Japan formally informs us that they are breaking the agreement and not honoring it, we have to assume we’re going forward.

So to answer your question, we have to assume that it is still executable. If the government in Tokyo desires to execute it, the Hatoyama government must take responsibility for doing so and get it done.

Q: Back in 2005, did the Japanese government tell you it was executable?

A: It is more than that. We said we will accept a solution that you commit to be executable. So the compromises that we made, in accepting the Henoko solution, were based on the assurances of the Japanese government that this was the executable plan.

Q: One argument of the Hatoyama administration and the ruling coalition as a whole is that the Lower House election was carried out with the DPJ’s pledge to review this agreement, and the DPJ won the election. All four Okinawa districts had candidates who ran on the platform to promise to review this agreement, and they all won. So the argument is that this is the people’s choice, and the Japanese government must act on it.

From your point of view, how do you think the Hatoyama administration, or Japan as a whole, should deal with this political development?

A: We appreciate that there is a new political reality, and that reality is that Prime Minister Hatoyama and Minshuto have made promises, or commitments, that have introduced incredible complications, digging a hole that only gets deeper with time and indecision.

In the first instance, this is not the problem of the United States, and we do not want the United States to be pulled into this political hole that the Hatoyama government has dug for itself with these promises.

And there has always been a fundamental problem in the defense of Japan, in that the central government consistently tries to put the United States between the central government and the people of Okinawa. This is not appropriate, and we should never be placed in such a situation.

We thought, with the agreement we reached, we had struck a fair agreement, and the responsibility for managing the Okinawa part of this had been properly taken on board by the central government.

What has now happened is the old dynamic of putting the United States in the middle, between the people of Okinawa and the Tokyo government, has now been recreated to our–to both the governments’–net deficit.

Q: Another argument is that even if the Hatoyama Cabinet decides on the Henoko option, it might not be executable because the political reality has changed and there are heightened expectations within Okinawa that the facility will be located outside of Okinawa Prefecture, if not out of the country.

The protest movement would be much more difficult for the Hatoyama administration to deal with.

What do you think of this argument?

A: I think that is a possible scenario. So I think what we need to do is honestly and openly discuss the consequences of such a scenario.

Because there is no plan B. That is, it is a relocation to Henoko, as we have agreed. Or failing to execute that agreement, we are forced to stay where we are.

Directly put, if we are forced to stay where we are, that is a recipe for both the Marine air group and the Marines being forced to make a decision to leave Okinawa, and in leaving Okinawa, leaving Japan.

Q: Why is there no plan B? Can you elaborate on that a bit more?

A: Because we have an agreement, and the agreement we have looked at plans B, C, D and E. Our years of close consultations looked at all the other options related to Okinawa. None of them worked. And that was by mutual agreement! That wasn’t a unilateral decision by the United States.

We also looked at other areas in Japan. We were very strongly discouraged from looking for anything in Japan outside of Okinawa.

Q: You were discouraged from looking outside Okinawa by the Japanese government?

A: Yes, by the Japanese government. But in absolute fairness, Futenma and the Futenma replacement facility needs to be where the Marines are. It is a capabilities issue, specifically an integrated capabilities issue, and integrated capabilities provide real deterrence.

So the idea that you could move just Futenma somewhere else and plunk it down, like a poker chip in the middle of Kyushu, is an irrational or half-baked idea.

So frankly, there is no plan B, because Henoko was the chosen solution. And from what we’ve seen, the Hatoyama government has failed to find a realistic and acceptable plan B.

Q: So if Hatoyama said it’s Henoko, but it will not work, and then decides on something other than Henoko, would the Marines have to withdraw from Okinawa?

A: No. I am saying that the net result of not solving this problem and going forward with Henoko will be to keep us where we are at Futenma, with both parties having recognized, 20 years ago, that we had to move from Futenma. The net result of this will be to eventually force us to leave Futenma because our continued presence there is not sustainable. We both agreed to this fact.

There are valid safety, encroachment, noise and other issues. And to put it bluntly, staying in Futenma for an undetermined period of time is absolutely not sustainable.

So we need to find a solution, or failing to find that solution, we need to confront the reality of having to leave.

Q: Why do you think it’s not sustainable?

A: Because the government of Japan, the central government, has promised the people of Okinawa that they will return Futenma to them. We have agreed to that.

There are safety issues there. There are encroachment issues. And the whole basis of our agreement to relocate 8,000 Marines and to return not just Futenma but all the other land that the Okinawa people wanted back, it’s all conditioned on leaving Futenma and relocating to a new facility.

So if everything stops, if the Futenma relocation stops, it means all elements of the greater Okinawa compromise stop.

We accept the fact that the people of Okinawa are not going to be happy with such a development. They’ve been promised a better solution, and they had that better solution in hand when the Hatoyama government came into power.

All that new government had to do was understand what compromises had been reached, the underlying logic of those arrangements, accept the value of the alliance and the requirements needed to sustain the credibility of the alliance, and then get on with the execution of that agreement.

So I think the reality is if we are confronted with just staying as we are, our current posture is not sustainable. And the politicians and Japanese government officials who should know this, do know this. They simply will not discuss this reality. It is the truth that dares not speak its name. And the next reality is, if the Marine Air Wing has to leave, the air facility has to leave.

Q: Are you referring to the helicopters?

A: It’s not just the helicopters. Again, it is the capability that the air facility gives us for normal operations and, very importantly, for contingency operations in the case of a defense-of-Japan conflict or a contingency related to Japan.

If we have to leave, if we’re not able to operate at Futenma, and this is the reality that is coming forward to meet us head-on, if we’re not able to operate from that facility, the entire capability of the overall Marine presence in Okinawa–and therefore in Japan–is compromised.

So it is not really just a question of the air component that would be forced to leave; it would be the entire Marine presence. If that is the decision that the Hatoyama government forces upon us, then I think the Hatoyama government must, up front and directly, face the consequences of that decision, acknowledge the strategic consequences for Japan of such an action.

This is not about a Marine air base; it’s about the United States’ ability to sustain a critical military presence in Japan.

These same Japanese leaders need to be able to openly discuss the reality that if that critical air capability presence, the Marine ground component and the headquarters units and the other elements that provide that deterrence are compelled to leave Japan, to where will these same capabilities relocate?

And with that relocation, what will be the net impact on the United States’ ability to honor our military capabilities and our defense relationship with Japan?

Q: Would those amphibious units in Sasebo and the air wing in Iwakuni also go?

A: I think that would necessarily be part of any reconsideration of the amphibious ships that are there to support the Marines that are here. Those related capabilities, (the aircraft and the ships) are based where they’re based . . . to support the Marine presence in Japan.

The amphibious ships are based there, and the Marine air wing is based at Iwakuni to provide the maximum capability to the Marines. So it is an air-ground-sea task element that has been created here, very carefully balanced, as a political and a military commitment.

So if the Marines are compelled to relocate in order to sustain that balanced capability, of course there’s no purpose for the amphibious ships to be here, and there may not be a purpose for the Iwakuni air wing to be here.

Q: So the entire Marine presence in Japan, not just the presence in Okinawa and also Sasebo, could go?

A: That is the real magnitude of what is at risk here, with this pending decision of whether or not Japan should honor an agreement it has made as a national security issue.

Any relocation out of Japan of all or even a major part of our combined Marine presence in Japan would represent a fundamental relocation of a critical capability for the defense of Japan. Therefore, making a decision about Henoko has a potential to force the United States, probably sooner rather than later, to make a negative decision to base itself elsewhere.

We must be located where we can properly exercise that capability. It really means that we would have to rethink our entire deployment strategy. These are heavy decisions that have long-lasting consequences.

Q: Where would they go?

A: That’s the $64,000 question. I cannot say where they would go, but this would be a strategic decision that would have to be made. But certainly, they would be going away from Japan, and this displacement, we must assume, will reduce substantially the defense posture of Japan. This would also result in a reduced credibility of the United States’ presence in Japan, our forward-basing in Japan.

Q: Would they go to Guam?

A: Perhaps some could go to Guam. Perhaps some would go to Hawaii. Perhaps back to the United States West Coast or elsewhere.

There is an additional danger here. That is, once this issue causes a process of fundamental repositioning to begin to occur, understand that many forces will be at work, including U.S. congressional forces. It will be very difficult to manage the sequence of events that play out. And this is not something we want to see happen.

But our biggest concern is that it seems the people in Japan that are making these decisions, the Hatoyama government and its political overlords, do not have any sense of the magnitude of the issue with which they are playing.

In the greater scheme of things (for) the security of Japan, it almost seems we have a group of boys and girls playing with a box of matches as they sit in a room of dynamite.

Long after they have endangered themselves, the real damage will be done to the house of Japan. And the American firemen will not be around once the decision is made to burn down the house.

You know what I’m saying. It is, “Do the people that are making these decisions understand the second and third order consequences of forcing the United States to make a very difficult decision?” That’s the issue.

Q: Tell me about what’s happening in Congress. We know that Daniel Inouye and Jim Webb recently visited Okinawa. What’s the atmosphere in Congress regarding this issue?

A: I think the atmosphere in Congress is one of disappointment. They believed that there was a realignment agreement that would protect and preserve the bilateral security relationship for the next 50 to 100 years. We told them that. We assured them that this was the outcome of the realignment and rebalancing we had agreed to with Japan when the agreement was reached.

Our Congress was intensely involved, Senator Inouye among other leaders, in the agreement. And these congressmen understood the details.

And now these congressional leaders see an agreement–and I here would not presume to speak for Senator Inouye–that is unraveling. And they’re very disappointed.

I think this development causes them to question the entire posture, our ability to retain a forward-based posture in the Pacific. The reasonable question they’re asking is, “If you fail to follow through with this realignment, how will this affect our U.S. capabilities to execute on our national commitments to the people of Japan?” And that’s the question that’s being asked.

As the Henoko agreement spirals down, you can bet this question will be pressed more aggressively in our Congress, as it should be.

Q: Tell me about the potential impact on deterrence if the Marines in Okinawa, or even Sasebo and Iwakuni, withdraw from Japan. What kind of a change would occur in the deterrence factor?

A: I think it would be hugely damaging to the credibility of our deterrence posture. Beyond deterrence, it substantially damages our ability to execute on the planning we have in place and the commitments we’ve made to Japan. So you have a loss of deterrence value, which is very important.

But the second half of this is if you lose the deterrence value, you also lose the ability to execute. So you have to ask yourself, “What is the net impact on the alliance?”

We have obligations under the alliance. Japan has obligations. This is Article 5 and Article 6, respectively.

If Japan is unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations under the alliance . . .

Q: Under Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty?

A: Yes. We have to re-evaluate our ability to deliver, under Article 5. It is that simple! This is not rocket science.

Q: Are you saying that the United States would not defend Japan?

A: No. What I am saying is the Hatoyama government must consider the real extended impact, having put us in the position of having a reduced capability to defend Japan. If the Hatoyama government puts us in that position, we have to be honest about what that action will have then done to the alliance.

There doesn’t seem to be any–any–consideration of the strategic impact of this issue on our ability to deliver what we have promised to deliver to the alliance. No consideration of the impact on our ability to deter and our ability to execute. Never has that issue, to my knowledge, been raised.

Q: But can the United States really afford to reduce its deterrence value in Japan? Won’t that damage the U.S. presence in this region in light of other major powers in this region, including China?

A: We cannot afford to do that. We cannot, from the standpoint of the United States.

Q: So you would stay anyway.

A: As best we can, but only as we can. But the first country that cannot afford the departure of these defense-of-Japan capabilities is Japan. The first endangered body is not the United States; it is Japan!

So why should this responsibility for such a fundamental adjustment be put on the shoulders of the United States rather than on the shoulders of the nation that is most directly affected?

We cannot afford to withdraw. But if we have to, we will. If we are given no choice, one has to leave.

The party that is most affected, Japan, doesn’t seem to grasp that elemental fact, nor does it understand that it is very close to putting us in an almost impossible position, pressing us to make a difficult decision.

Q: Tell me the realities we may face if we really go down the road of having the Marines forced to leave Okinawa and Japan. What’s would happen? Would China, for example, take over the disputed Senkakus?

A: I have no idea how this would play out. But think about this. What is happening–what might happen, what could happen, will happen, and very probably would happen–is that the responsibility for making the decision to stay in Japan will be put exclusively on the back of the United States.

At some point we’ll have to make that decision.

This will be an unmistakable signal to the other powers in the region, both our friends, our potential enemies, and other third-level powers who have ambitions to be disruptive or troublemakers. I certainly would put North Korea in that latter category, as its grinds out its nuclear weapons.

Think of the message that is being communicated today to China, to the Korean Peninsula, to our allies in the region, be it Australia, Singapore, to India. The message is that Japan and the United States cannot properly manage their security relationship, a Japan that is unwilling and unable to execute agreements it has entered into with its alliance partner.

The assorted nations of Greater Asia are watching a situation evolve in which the United States may have to, may be forced to, reposture itself in the Western Pacific. For all them–friend, foe, fence-sitters and assorted trouble-makers–this is a huge issue. If the body politic of Japan is too busy with domestic politics to watch this play out, other parties will do so for them and draw the appropriate conclusions.

In fact, it seems to us that this is almost more important to other countries in the region, like Australia, Singapore, India and certainly South Korea, than it is to Japan. Which is incredible!

Q: If the Marines leave, could Japan fill the vacuum by enhancing its own defense capabilities?

A: I think that will be a decision that will have to be made by the Japanese government and the Japanese people. But remember, what you’re losing is not just a given capability. You’re losing an alliance capability and the strategic connection, which eventually leads to strategic deterrence, that the Marine Corps’ presence provides.

This is assured, in the final instance, by the U.S. Marine Corps’ physical presence in the territory of Japan, which is Okinawa.

When you start disturbing that fundamental relationship, it leads to a range of other questions about the sustainability of the alliance. And I would suggest that the departure of the Marines would call into question the basic sustainability of this alliance as it is.

It would probably trigger a fundamental readjustment, necessarily, of this alliance. It would probably trigger major questions in our Congress about what our commitments are to Japan and why we have to have those commitments. I also think it would probably trigger a major reorientation of the regional security posture.

Japan will be the triple loser in any such event. But if Japan does not care, if its leaders are so distracted or have another plan, so be it.

Q: Hatoyama set May as the deadline for a decision. But that’s not a deadline set by the United States.

A: No.

Q: What would the U.S. reaction be if Hatoyama continued to drag on this issue?

A: I think we’ve been extremely patient up to this point. We believed him when he said he would have this issue resolved by December. We’ve now believe him when he said he would have it resolved by May.

There are hints that Hatoyama may attempt to delay this decision until after the July election. We see no value whatsoever in delaying this decision. It is only getting worse with time. It is not getting better.

When you have dug yourself a great big hole, it is usually wise to stop digging, or somebody has to take away the shovel.

What I want to capture is that there does not seem to be an appreciation that the Henoko issue will set in motion a necessarily complete reassessment of our entire posture. You know what I mean.

What this would do is highlight the fact that Japan is not a dependable ally, and it is, therefore, not an ally on whom, with whom, we can construct our deterrence strategy.

A forced departure, or a decision that forces us to consider departing our forces from Okinawa, would impact the overall political relationship long before any forces depart Japan. Just the fact that we would have to examine this possibility seriously will, in itself, set in motion a whole chain of considerations and reassessments.

So it is not the physical departure that triggers this; it’s the fact that we have to consider, almost immediately, when, how, what our options are. That, in turn, is going to get our Congress involved, and it will compel our military planners involved. This situation will quickly get out of control, and once the momentum and goodwill move away from Japan, it will be very difficult for Japan to put this problem back in the box.

The “knock-on” effect of a forced Marine departure, on the alliance itself but on all of our security relationships in Asia, shouldn’t be underestimated. A fundamental re-examination would lead us to make decisions that are lasting.

And if Japan is willing to accept that as the consequence of what they’re doing now, that’s fine. But a leader, Mr. Hatoyama as the leader in his party, must accept the consequences of what he and his party leadership has set in motion.

Q: One argument is that if Japan sets up a new multilateral “talk shop” in the region, like an East Asia summit, and then gains the confidence among those regional states, including China, then Japan wouldn’t have to depend on the U.S. presence as much as in the past. What do you say to this kind of argument?

A: Well, this is a decision that this government has to make. It was elected. It still has four more years to serve, I guess. And if its national strategy is to “jaw-jaw,” as Churchill would say, and create an East Asia Community with attendant security components, and that is how this government plans to provide for and enhance the security of Japan, then I think the Hatoyama government has to explain that to us. And then we have to talk very seriously about what that means for the alliance.

Here’s the question. And, this comes back to Henoko. Is there any evidence that the reduction of our capabilities in Japan and the weakening of the alliance, which will happen, in any way increases security for Japan?

The actual result will be different. It will embolden China. And it will embolden any country, such as North Korea, that wants to pick a fight or do something negative related to Japan.

So if you’re going to begin the process of dismantling, which is what we’re talking about, the quality of the alliance and, therefore, the quality of the deterrence that this alliance provides. If you’re going to do that, then one had best figure out what one is going to replace it with.

And we haven’t heard any ideas on how this new government would plan to replace the existing capability and the existing deterrence with a substitute mechanism.

Q: DPJ Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa said, as you know, the Seventh Fleet is enough. So there is a school of thought within this administration and among its supporters that the current arrangement is more than enough for the defense of Japan.

What do you think of the argument that the Marines would not be necessary if the Seventh Fleet stays? For that matter, would the Fifth Air Force be enough?

A: First of all, I think that this particular Mr. Ozawa statement, I hope, was taken out of context. But if it wasn’t, it reveals an incredible naivete, simplicity and lack of judgment.

He can’t have meant what he said and be a logically, reasonably informed individual. And Mr. Ozawa is smarter than this.

So I think we take it that this statement was made for political merit and political impact, not as a serious statement by a man who, previously, was very well attuned to national security interests.

But if we were to take the statement at face value–the idea that Japan would have the level of deterrence simply by the Seventh Fleet remaining as currently based–(it) contains the assumption that our Congress would accept the continued basing of a nuclear carrier battle group in Japan after Japan has basically run the Marines out of town.

The nuclear carrier battle group is a United States’ national strategic capability. The idea that we would leave a national strategic capability in a country that had declared other military capabilities we deemed essential to the defense of Japan to be now unnecessary is delusional.

Q: Are you saying that if the Marines are forced to leave, the USS George Washington carrier group, the battle group, will also leave?

A: No. What I am suggesting is that when you start changing the basic equation, you start messing with basic assumptions. One cannot, Japan cannot, presume that it will be able to keep the perceived jewel in the crown–the nuclear carrier battle group–while picking apart the other elements in the security equation that we, the partner, deem to be essential.

The idea that you can keep some things and discard others is fantasy. So perhaps there was a little bit of fantasy mixed in with strategic, geostrategic and real domestic politics going on with Mr. Ozawa at the time he made his comments. I think he knows better. I think Ozawa knows much better and he understands what is at risk here as the politics of Henoko play out.

Q: Aren’t your views on the FRF agreement and the potential consequence of its failure more hard-line than that of Obama administration? Isn’t the Obama administration more flexible? To what extent do your statements reflect the views and positions of the Obama administration?

A: My views are my own, but they are informed by eight years of determined work trying to make the alliance better and sustainable. My comments are further informed by active dialogue with senior serving U.S. officials, all of whom believed that they had transitioned into a bilateral relationship that was positively focused on executing agreements reached between two alliance partners.

Frustration with Japan is broad and deep. Any suggestions from the members of the so-called Japan Club, some of whom may be a bit too eager to find any solution that buries this issue, that Henoko is a minor misunderstanding or just another airbase, completely miss the dimensions and the import of this issue.

On the flexibility of the Obama administration, the suggestion here seems to be that the U.S. must now find a way to compromise on this issue to accommodate Japanese domestic politics, and that once flexible, we will be on our way to a better alliance relationship.

As we say back in Illinois, “That dog does not hunt.”

The Obama administration may at some point be willing to compromise, in some fashion, but this is far from certain. In any case, one has to ask what will be the net result of a U.S. compromise that leaves the alliance less capable and core issues still unresolved.

As I noted, there are consequences here far beyond Japan and the self-marginalization that Japan as a nation, and as a security partner, appears to have embarked upon.