Tag: Movements and Resistance

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Vieques underwater ordnance leaking carcinogenic toxins

The study cited below looked at contamination from deteriorating underwater munitions in the sea around Vieques, Puerto Rico.  There are also thousands of tons of unexploded munitions, including chemical weapons, in the waters surrounding Hawai’i.  James Porter, the researcher from the University of Georgia, will be presenting his findings at an international conference on underwater munitions being held in Honolulu in February.  Here’s the link to the conference website: http://underwatermunitions.com/index.php

Old ordnance under the sea may be toxic – study

By CHRIS LAMBIE Staff Reporter

January 17, 2009

Unexploded munitions lying under the sea leak cancer-causing toxins, a new study shows.

The research, to be presented at a conference in Hawaii next month, looked at a naval gunnery and bombing range off Puerto Rico where many munitions failed to explode. But James Porter, the ecologist who conducted the study on reefs at the eastern end of Isla de Vieques, said he would expect to find the same results anywhere in the world that bombs and bullets have been dumped into the sea, including Nova Scotia.

“The problem that we have studied looks at the unexploded ordnance, which then lie on the sea floor, corrode and leak these toxic materials into the ocean,” Mr. Porter said Friday in a telephone interview from his office at the University of Georgia.

“It’s not a problem that’s isolated in one country. I would think every nation that has a coastline would have this problem.”

This province has more than its fair share of unexploded ordnance in its waters, said Terry Long, a Cape Breton man who is organizing next month’s Second International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions.

“There’s more than 3,000 munitions sites off the coast of Nova Scotia,” said Mr. Long, a former military engineer who now works on ordnance and munitions disposal.

“There are approximately 45 shipwrecks in Halifax Harbour, of which 35 contain munitions. The Bedford Basin is full of munitions from the 1945 (Bedford) Magazine explosion.”

Representatives of the Department of National Defence are slated to attend the Feb. 25-27 conference in Honolulu.

But a DND spokeswoman said she was unable to provide answers Friday to questions about dangers posed by unexploded ordnance in Canadian waters.

One of the most common toxins found in the Puerto Rico study was trinitrotoluene, commonly known as TNT.

“There were, in fact, eight different cancer-causing chemicals that we found in high concentrations,” Mr. Porter said.

He found the substances had made their way into corals and sea urchins in high concentrations.

“One coral colony had 600 milligrams per kilogram TNT in the flesh of a living coral,” he said. “That’s horrifically high, and it exceeds the (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s) cancer-causing safety standards.”

Toxins were also found in more mobile sea life, including lobster and fish, but those levels were within acceptable health limits, Mr. Porter said.

“The next study that needs to be done would be by oncologists, who would try to find out whether the seafood, which does have these chemicals in them – that’s what we’ve shown – is being consumed in quantities that would explain the cancers (in the local human population),” he said.

Militaries, including Canada’s, clean up their ranges on land by removing unexploded ordnance.

“One of the things I would like to see is to have that common practice of range maintenance extended to include the shallow, near-shore environment,” Mr. Porter said. “There’s no reason why these things shouldn’t be picked up. We can do it; we have the technology to do this.”

His co-author, James Barton, has built a remote-control machine that lifts unexploded ordnance off the ocean floor, puts it in a basket and sends it to the surface for disposal.

“It looks sort of like an underwater backhoe,” Mr. Porter said.

Cleaning up unexploded munitions off this province’s coasts would create work and help counter the effects of the recession, Mr. Long said.

“We’ve got 3,000 sites off Nova Scotia but we don’t have any cleanups going, not one active cleanup,” he said.

“The time is right. Let’s put our people to work and clean up these sites.”

(clambie@herald.ca)

© 2008 The Halifax Herald Limited

Source:http://thechronicleherald.ca/NovaScotia/1101147.html

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Clarifying misperceptions about the Superferry

http://www.kauaiworld.com/articles/2009/01/26/opinion/kauai/doc497d331b4f8ac160221093.prt

Clarifying misperceptions about the Superferry

By Andrea Brower, George Inouye, Noelani Rogers and Ed Coll

Published: Monday, January 26, 2009 3:09 AM HST

Hawai‘i Superferry has been debated in Hawai‘i ever since the newly elected Gov. Lingle assigned her chief of staff, Bob Awana, to personally consult and expedite the HSF project back in 2002.

Since then, volumes of information have reached every Hawai‘i resident; factual and informative, partial and biased, sometimes not true at all. As a result, public opinion has formed up around ideology and personal interest, often without basis in fact. Here, then, are four common misperceptions about the Superferry.

The first misperception is that a study just released, mandated by the Oct. 29, 2007 Act II legislation, is a legitimate environmental impact statement. That report, being called an EIS, is lacking a critical component of a true Environmental Impact Statement, as defined in the National and Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Acts. Both include an option of “no action.”

That means if the study shows that environmental impacts are very serious and cannot be mitigated, then the project must be terminated. An EIS should be conducted before the start of a project in the same way that a driver should be licensed and the car have a safety check before being allowed on the road.

The misnamed “EIS” recently released by the contractor Belt Collins omits the “no action” alternative; it was custom-tailored by the legislature in special session to suit the needs of HSF. That means that any findings, no matter how disastrous to the environment, will not get in the way of the company’s operations.

The second misperception, fostered by the Lingle administration, is that there is no connection between HSF and the military. In its Public Utilities application in June 2004, HSF Inc. “anticipated that an entire battalion of 350 Stryker tanks will be able to be transported from O‘ahu to their training grounds on the Big Island in four trips…”

Soon after that, CEO John Lehman was quoted in Pacific Business News as saying the Superferry “will make it easier for soldiers to train when the Stryker Brigade comes to Hawai‘i.”

Misperception number three: Being against HSF is to be against alternative modes of transportation. This is a false division. Almost all “Superferry protesters” are in favor of an inter-island ferry service. How would these ferries be different? They would carry passengers only, with some cargo capacity.

That would substantially reduce the threat of invasive pest transfer and removal of already depleted ocean and mountain resources from the outer islands. No more searching of vehicles and personal property. Their speed would be like that of other inter-island vessels, the danger to whales being nearly eliminated. The ferries would be sized appropriately for our travel needs, would have a clean, cost-effective propulsion system and would be Hawai‘i-owned, either privately or publicly.

The fourth misperception is that those opposed to the Superferry don’t care about the economy. Hawaii’s economy starts and ends with our environment and our indigenous culture. It is worth noting that in a poll by National Geographic Travel Magazine to select favorite island vacation destinations, in which O‘ahu placed 104 out of 111 choices, poll respondents cited overdevelopment of the island and trivialization and commercialization of the Hawaiians’ culture.

Hawai‘i Superferry, publicizing itself as the H4, extends that develop-and-exploit mindset to the outer islands. Where did Kaua‘i place in that poll? 64th.

If viewed in the context of promoting a healthy local economy, those who think Superferry would be good for business should be careful what they wish for. Businesses on O‘ahu, from plumbers to surf instructors, would leap at the opportunity to expand to Kaua‘i. And with their higher sales volume allowing for lower profit margin, they would be very competitive indeed.

In a larger context, for many on the neighbor islands, a good portion of what they put on the table comes from the mountains and the sea. Unlike O‘ahu, we have considerable remaining natural resources.

When oil prices climb again, and traditional jobs and money become more scarce, these resources and our agricultural lands, our “natural” economy, will be needed to bridge us to a future where we must supply much more of our own needs, while maintaining and restoring the resources as well.

The real equation is: To oppose Superferry is to oppose the way the democratic process was completely discarded. Gov. Lingle bent over backward to give a New York corporation, the HSF, whatever it wanted, when it wanted.

That included calling the special session to craft a law, the constitutionality of which is now being questioned by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court.

Here we have neither a company nor an administration that have shown respect for our local communities.

Andrea Brower is a coordinator for Malama Kaua‘i. George Inouye is a Westside fisherman. Noelani Rogers is a Kanaka Maoli activist. Ed Coll is a teacher at Kaua‘i Community College

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‘Tragedy Assistance’ or Ending the Tragedy?

Near the end of this article it mentions the suicide of Air Force Staff Sgt. Brandon Stagner, who suffered from PTSD and was about to redeploy to on his fourth tour to Iraq. Very sad.  I didn’t know Brandon, but I know some of his family.  His father Ishmael Stagner is a respected kupuna in the Hawaiian community, and his sister Carmael worked with LGBTQ youth at the AFSC Hawai’i office.  This young man was another human sacrifice for bloodthirsty gods of war and empire.

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Group brings together grieving military families

A support group holds its first-ever event in Hawaii

Wearing the buttons with photos of fallen loved one, bereaved military families gathered yesterday in the first-ever Hawaii seminar for the Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors, or TAPS.

The program helps families of U.S. military service members who have died in the service of the country.

Yesterday, children wrote about lost loved ones in letters that were tied to balloons and released into the sky above Waikiki.

Bonnie Carroll, founder of the 15-year-old nationwide program, said she hopes to make grief seminars in Hawaii an annual event. Darcie Sims, national director of training, said Hawaii’s aloha spirit is conducive to the TAPS mission.

“There’s a natural warmth and openness here we sometimes don’t see on the mainland,” Sims said. “They’re very open to helping, and they’ve been so welcoming to us.”

– Gene Park

FULL STORY >>

By Gene Park

POSTED: 01:30 a.m. HST, Jan 25, 2009

After Army Spc. Toby Olsen’s death in Iraq, his mother, Elisabeth Olsen, struggled to heal. Two years later she wants to help others who have also suffered the loss of a loved one in the military.

Olsen said she got help dealing with her grief from the Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors, or TAPS, a private organization created to help families of military service members who have died in the service of their country.

Olsen’s son, a Mililani High School graduate, died on Jan. 20, 2007, after an explosion hit his vehicle in Iraq.

She said TAPS is able to bring together people who are going through similar experiences.

“When you don’t have to say a word because you know you’re looking into the eyes of another mother, there’s a connection,” she said. “It’s a family you never wanted to join.”

Olsen said she discovered TAPS when attending the national remembrance ceremony for fallen troops in Washington, D.C.

Yesterday the group held its first grief seminar in Hawaii.

More than 50 people attended. Some were local families, like Olsen. Others came from the mainland, like Victor, N.Y., resident Andrea Ralyea.

Ralyea said her 3-year-old son started asking about his uncle, Army Sgt. Jonathan Lootens, who died in a suicide bomb attack in Kirkuk, Iraq, on Oct. 16, 2006.

“I didn’t know how to answer those questions,” Ralyea said.

She got in touch with TAPS and attended a survivor seminar in Philadelphia. She came to the Hawaii seminar because Lootens was stationed at Schofield Barracks.

“I almost expect him to be here, but it’s nice to be able to be here and be where he was,” she said. “I find great comfort in it.”

Children and teenagers also spoke with counselors, who said that many of them never were able to vocalize their feelings before yesterday. The children wrote their feelings in letters which were tied to balloons and released outside the Hilton Hawaiian Village, where the seminar was held.

Hawaii is a great environment for TAPS, said Darcie Sims, TAPS national director of training. Sims has been with the group since 1995, one year after its inception.

“There’s a natural warmth and openness here we sometimes don’t see on the mainland,” Sims said. “They’re very open to helping, and they’ve been so welcoming to us.”

Sims said TAPS was borne out of necessity because self-help books and programs on grieving military families did not exist. Sims lost a brother during the Vietnam War, and her father to a nuclear weapons accident.

“Families did back then what they still do today, put one foot in front of the other,” Sims said. “We are literally a family organization, reaching out. When the checks have stopped, when the papers have been filed, this family is there.”

Olsen said she has volunteered to be a local point of contact for the organization, and hopes to make TAPS seminars a regular event for Hawaii.

TAPS has a telephone hot line manned at all hours, if family members need someone to talk to.

It is a valuable resource for newly grieving parents Ishmael and Carmen Stagner of Kaneohe.

Their son, Air Force Staff Sgt. Brandon K. Stagner, committed suicide in November while stationed in Alaska, but before going on his fourth tour of duty in Iraq. His parents said he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.

“We all think we’re John Wayne … but the fact of the matter is that it’s just a shell,” Ishmael Stagner said. “But maybe the heroes are also the ones who live and have to go on.”

After Army Spc. Toby Olsen’s death in Iraq, his mother, Elisabeth Olsen, struggled to heal. Two years later she wants to help others who have also suffered the loss of a loved one in the military.

Olsen said she got help dealing with her grief from the Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors, or TAPS, a private organization created to help families of military service members who have died in the service of their country.

Olsen’s son, a Mililani High School graduate, died on Jan. 20, 2007, after an explosion hit his vehicle in Iraq.

She said TAPS is able to bring together people who are going through similar experiences.

“When you don’t have to say a word because you know you’re looking into the eyes of another mother, there’s a connection,” she said. “It’s a family you never wanted to join.”

Olsen said she discovered TAPS when attending the national remembrance ceremony for fallen troops in Washington, D.C.

Yesterday the group held its first grief seminar in Hawaii.

More than 50 people attended. Some were local families, like Olsen. Others came from the mainland, like Victor, N.Y., resident Andrea Ralyea.

Ralyea said her 3-year-old son started asking about his uncle, Army Sgt. Jonathan Lootens, who died in a suicide bomb attack in Kirkuk, Iraq, on Oct. 16, 2006.

“I didn’t know how to answer those questions,” Ralyea said.

She got in touch with TAPS and attended a survivor seminar in Philadelphia. She came to the Hawaii seminar because Lootens was stationed at Schofield Barracks.

“I almost expect him to be here, but it’s nice to be able to be here and be where he was,” she said. “I find great comfort in it.”

Children and teenagers also spoke with counselors, who said that many of them never were able to vocalize their feelings before yesterday. The children wrote their feelings in letters which were tied to balloons and released outside the Hilton Hawaiian Village, where the seminar was held.

Hawaii is a great environment for TAPS, said Darcie Sims, TAPS national director of training. Sims has been with the group since 1995, one year after its inception.

“There’s a natural warmth and openness here we sometimes don’t see on the mainland,” Sims said. “They’re very open to helping, and they’ve been so welcoming to us.”

Sims said TAPS was borne out of necessity because self-help books and programs on grieving military families did not exist. Sims lost a brother during the Vietnam War, and her father to a nuclear weapons accident.

“Families did back then what they still do today, put one foot in front of the other,” Sims said. “We are literally a family organization, reaching out. When the checks have stopped, when the papers have been filed, this family is there.”

Olsen said she has volunteered to be a local point of contact for the organization, and hopes to make TAPS seminars a regular event for Hawaii.

TAPS has a telephone hot line manned at all hours, if family members need someone to talk to.

It is a valuable resource for newly grieving parents Ishmael and Carmen Stagner of Kaneohe.

Their son, Air Force Staff Sgt. Brandon K. Stagner, committed suicide in November while stationed in Alaska, but before going on his fourth tour of duty in Iraq. His parents said he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.

“We all think we’re John Wayne … but the fact of the matter is that it’s just a shell,” Ishmael Stagner said. “But maybe the heroes are also the ones who live and have to go on.”

Source: http://www.starbulletin.com/news/20090125_Group_brings_together_grieving_military_families.html?page=1&c=y

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Katharine Moon: Military Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia

Japan Focus

Military Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia

Katharine H.S. Moon

Where there are soldiers, there are women who exist for them. This is practically a cliché. History is filled with examples of women as war booty and “camp followers,” their bodies being used for service labor of various kinds, including sex. Contrary to common assumptions in the West, prostitution is not “part of Asian culture.” Just about every culture under the sun has some version of it during times of war and times of peace.

In some ways, military prostitution (prostitution catering to, and sometimes organized by, the military) has been so commonplace that people rarely stop to think about how and why it is created, sustained, and incorporated into military life and warfare. Academic interest and analysis of this issue gained momentum only in the last twenty years and still remains scant and sporadic. Even as interest in women and gender as categories of analysis has increased in many academic disciplines, there is still a question of intellectual “legitimacy,” that is, whether prostitutes, prostitution, and sex work warrant “serious” scholarly attention and resources, especially for students of international politics. After all, it is a highly “personal” and therefore “subjective” matter and prone toward the proverbial “he said/she said” contestation. To boot, many have turned the feminist emphasis on women and agency on its head by glibly claiming that most military prostitutes sought out the work and life of their own free will and therefore are exercising their agency. In this view, it is primarily about women’s personal decisions and responsibility to face the consequences; governments and other institutions of society need not be held accountable.

For decades, key leaders of Asian women’s movements such as Takazato Suzuyo of Okinawa and Matsui Yayori, the well-known Japanese journalist and feminist activist, Aida Santos and women’s organizations like GABRIELA of the Philippines have argued to the contrary. They documented and insisted that U.S. military prostitution in Okinawa/Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines involve a complex “system” of central and local government policies, political repression, economic inequalities and oppression of the underclass, police corruption, debt bondage of women by bar owners, in addition to pervasive sexist norms and attitudes in both the U.S. military and the respective Asian society. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Asian feminists raised these connections, they tended to fault patriarchal and sexist values together with power inequalities emanating from them and the economic and political disparities among nations.

Such individuals and organizations also emphasized the compromised sovereignty of their own governments in relationship with the more powerful U.S. government and military, resulting in the compromised rights and dignity of the Korean, Okinawan, Filipina and other women who “serviced” American military (male) personnel. Aida Santos, a long-time activist opposing U.S. military bases in the Philippines (and later the Visiting Forces Agreement) wrote in the early 1990s that in the Philippines, “[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty.”[1] Such activists made the case that the personal is indeed political and international. [2] “Olongapo Rose,” a 1988 documentary film by the British Broadcasting Corporation about U.S. military prostitution in the Philippines graphically depicts the various political, economic, cultural, and racial “systems” at work.

Even under authoritarian rule in the 1970s, Filipinas did not hesitate to speak up and campaign nationally and internationally against the Philippines authorities and the U.S. military for abetting and condoning the physical, sexual, and economic exploitation and violence against women who worked in the R&R industry along Olongapo and Subic Bay, where U.S. forces had been stationed until the early 1990s. But in Korea, even progressive activists of the 1970s and 1980s, who fought against military dictatorship, labor repression, and the violation of human rights overlooked military prostitution as a political issue. For one, they had their plates full, challenging the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes. Second, as much as some activists criticized the dominant role of the United States in the alliance relationship, others were loath to attack a fundamental institution that safeguarded Korean security. Of course, the legal system was stacked against them. With the National Security Law squarely in place, critics of the U.S. military or the alliance could be thrown into prison, tortured, or killed. Third, military prostitutes were so beneath the political radar screen of most progressives because the women themselves were viewed as “dirty,” lowest of the low, and “tainted” because they slept with foreign soldiers. A highly puritanical and moralistic sense of ethnonationalism among most Koreans had exiled Korean military prostitutes from the larger Korean society and political arena. It is common knowledge among military prostitutes and their advocates that the formers’ family often disowned them upon learning of their “shameful” lives.

But in 1988, Yu Boknim, a Korean democracy activist, and Faye Moon, an American missionary and social activist became mavericks even among progressive dissidents by paying attention to the plight of the Korean gijichon (camptown) women. Together with the assistance of a handful of student activists and the financial support of some Protestant churches, they established Durebang (My Sister’s Place) in 1988 as a counseling center, shelter, and later bakery (to generate income for older women who had left the sex business and younger women who wanted to get out). But despite their efforts to raise awareness of the relationship between the presence of U.S. bases and the growth of this underclass of women and their Amerasian children, most of Korean society continued to ignore the women and their needs. Rather, Yu and Moon found increasing solidarity with their activist counterparts from the Philippines, Okinawa/Japan, and the United States as women began to organize around issues of sexual violence and slavery, militarism, and human rights in the Asia-Pacific.

Currently, military prostitution in Korea has been transformed in line with global economic and migration trends. Foreign nationals, primarily from the Philippines and the former Soviet Union, have become the majority of sex-providers and “entertainers” for the U.S. troops. Young Korean women, with better education and economic and social opportunities than their mothers or grandmothers, are not available for such work. And they are not as easily duped by traffickers. In a more complex, globalized and multicultural sex industry environment, however, political and legal accountability for various problems and conflicts that both the prostitutes and the servicemen encounter become even more difficult to understand and more difficult for activists to target effectively. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis, hardworking advocacy organizations on behalf of the women, such as Saewoomtuh, continue to offer shelter, counseling, and health and legal assistance to the best of their ability.

 

So, if military prostitution around U.S. bases in Asia has been an institution found wherever US forces are stationed since the mid-20th century-including, in addition to Japan, Okinawa, South Korea and the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, the Pacific Islands and many others–and individual activists and concerned organizations have labored to raise political and societal awareness of this issue, why has it reached the pages of the New York Times-through the Korean case-only in 2009? The answer lies in a gradual evolution of international and domestic developments that has created some opening for the issue of military prostitution in Korea to become more public.

For starters, the concept of “women’s human rights” and the practice of generating norms and codifying laws have become popularized and prioritized only since the 1990s. Feminist activism on such matters has been around longer, but the “mainstreaming” of women’s human rights is relatively new, with emphasis on the urgency of addressing violence against women, human trafficking, and gender-based economic inequalities.

In East Asia, various regional networks and cooperation among women’s organizations have facilitated the exchange of information about military and civilian forms of prostitution and a wider audience than was available in each national community. The “comfort women” movement, which demanded official apologies, historical accountability, and compensation from the Japanese government for the sexual violence committed against Korean and other women by Japanese troops during the Pacific War, helped shed light on political abuses long regarded as “private” mishaps. Moreover, the social movement around former Japanese “comfort women” had overshadowed advocacy efforts on behalf of the U.S. military prostitutes. The survivors of Japanese sex slavery were older than the survivors of military prostitution, making the claims of the former more urgent. But more than that, activists in the Korean comfort women movement and many of the survivors themselves generally shunned even a remote association with U.S. military prostitutes because the latter were deemed to have freely and willingly sold their bodies. [3] The comfort women movement gained international legitimacy and stature partly because the former victims were viewed as innocents who had been forcibly violated. Nevertheless, the surviving comfort women have faced continuing skepticism about their innocence and purity from the Japanese right.

But with the comfort women issue having achieved some gains since the Korean movement for redress took off in the early 1990s-Japanese apology, albeit wishy-washy under former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo,[4] private compensation from Japan, support by the United Nations apparatus and numerous NGOs, and most recently, the passage of the nonbinding U.S. House Resolution 121 that called upon the Japanese government to apologize for its sexual enslavement of women during World War II-there is a bit more political space that former military prostitutes might share. It should be noted that the women who desire to seek apology and compensation from the Korean government and the U.S. military are themselves elderly, ill, frail, and without much time left to their lives. They now feel their own urgency to get their life stories out and to claim recognition and redress for their sacrifices.

Additionally, individual incidents of violence against women in U.S. military camptowns, which have been common through the decades of the U.S. presence in Asia, have gained broader attention in these societies since the 1990s. In Korea, the egregious murder of Yun Geumi by a U.S. serviceman in October, 1992 [5] was not unique in terms of the degree of abuse and brutality. But it catalyzed local camptown consciousness about the disproportionate burdens that the villages and towns housing U.S. bases in Korea have borne for decades. And it became a call to action for a small group of Korean progressives to organize on behalf of Korean civilians living and working near the bases. The National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, which eventually became the leading organization that scrutinizes and documents-and when necessary, mobilizes around-the actions of U.S. commands and the conduct of U.S. troops as they affect Korean civilians, was born in the aftermath of Yun’s murder.[6] But for the most part, Yun’s death remained a localized and politically contained issue in the early-mid-1990s.

In Japan, the highly publicized gang rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl in 1995 by three U.S. Marines galvanized political activism and brought wider attention to military-related violence against women. Unlike the rape of the girl, Yun’s murder did not itself spark a national debate about the presence and prerogatives of the U.S. forces or a crisis in the alliance relationship. On one evel, the murder of a prostitute did not elicit as much public sympathy and ire as the rape of a school girl, which triggered action toward an Okinawan referendum on the bases and the establishment of the joint Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa “to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.”[7] For Koreans, the timing was not conducive to focusing on violence against camptown women because both Seoul and Washington were hip-deep in the first nuclear crisis concerning North Korea. Hammering out the Agreed Framework of 1994 was the major preoccupation of the United States regarding the Korean peninsula. In 1993-94, the Korean government itself had little interest and leverage to seek justice for a dead prostitute; it was fixated on not being left out of the negotiation process between Pyongyang and Washington. On another level, Korean civil society organizations were still in the process of forming and learning how to shape and adapt to the new political parameters that were being created in the aftermath of formal democratization in 1988. Making local politics and violence against women matter to the larger public and government after four decades to the contrary was new and challenging.

Okinawans, on the other hand, benefited from opportune timing. For one, a delegation of women representing peace and women’s human rights groups had just returned from the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing. They responded immediately upon learning of the rape by establishing organizations and mobilizing existing networks that were to become key players in regional and international activism addressing U.S. bases, violence against women, anti-militarism, and human rights for the next decade. The fact that Okinawa enjoyed a governor, Ota Masahide, who was bent on asserting new powers of local
autonomy and challenging the central government’s hegemony over Okinawa’s land usage, economic and security arrangements was also instrumental. By contrast, Korea in 1992-93 had just begun to explore the process of decentralizing government, and at the time of the murder of Yun, autonomous local governments did not exist, and local residents’ identity as a legitimate and effective political community was inchoate. Today, however, local administrative autonomy and residents’ sense of empowerment and entitlement are quite robust. Social movements and opposition parties can and do make claims on the
central government and criticize U.S. bases and U.S.-South Korean relations without fearing the repression that had prevailed for most of the history of the Korean republic.[8]

Internal factors within the United States also provide a context in which the older generation of Korean women who worked and lived as sex providers to the U.S. forces can claim official apology and compensation. Since the early-mid 1990s, international trafficking of human beings for sexual labor and other forms of abuse has been an official part of the U.S. policy agenda. The Clinton administration was particularly active in this regard, with the Department of State under Madeleine Albright playing a leading role. Furthermore, in 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, which established new protections for women in the domestic sex industry who were willing to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to convict traffickers. The law also put the world on notice that the U.S. seeks to be a leader in preventing and combating human trafficking and mandated the State Department to issue annual status reports of various countries’ efforts to fight trafficking.

Moreover, some members of the U.S. media have focused attention on the issue, Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times being the most prominent in recent years. But earlier in 2002, a FOX TV team had travelled to Korea to document the U.S. military’s involvement in the Korean sex industry and in international trafficking of women. This created a big stir in Washington, prompting members of Congress to write to the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to investigate the situation in Korea and other overseas bases. The R&R/sex industry that long had been an integral part of the landscape and the person-to-person interactions between Americans and Koreans became exposed to the larger world and highly newsworthy.

The Pentagon indeed took congressional and media scrutiny seriously and mandated inspector generals to investigate and report on any connection between trafficking and the U.S. military. And in response, commands in Korea cracked down on servicemen and bars suspected of using trafficked women as “hostesses” and entertainers by putting them off limits for periods of time. The U.S. commands also waged public awareness campaigns through radio and periodic education sessions to warn its troops that it does not condone soldiers’ association with prostitution and trafficking. The newspaper for the 2nd Infantry Division, Indianhead, quoted Capt. Kent Bennett, 2nd Inf. Div. Preventive Medicine Officer that “‘[p] rostitution and trafficking are demeaning acts toward women,'” and that by participating, “a Soldier is contributing to the enslavement of women and girls from all over the world.”[9] The article also stated that the U.S. Department of Defense is pushing to change the Uniform Code of Military Justice so that “Soldiers who are found convicted of soliciting prostitution may be dishonorably discharged.” These developments in the U.S. government and military reflect a new sensitivity and responsiveness to public scrutiny and pressures around military prostitution, but it is unclear to what extent institutional changes are systematically planned and enforced and whether the individual conduct of servicemen changes in the long run. These developments also point to a new vulnerability on the part of the U.S. military establishment. They can no longer avoid public oversight over a practice that soldiers and sailors took for granted as part of their “R&R” entitlement for a very long time. But U.S. military policy and behavioral changes that take place now and in the future would come too late for the women who had “serviced” American men in the past.

The domestic and international developments I describe above do matter in terms of whether issues like prostitution, trafficking, violence against women can find a political venue and audience. However, only the individuals who have experienced trafficking, prostitution, and violence can educate us about these conditions as lived realities. And it takes courage to come forward. The elderly women featured in the New York Times have decided that their time has come.

See “Ex-Prostitutes Say South Korea and U.S. Enabled Sex Trade Near Bases” by Choe Sang-Hun

Katharine H.S. Moon is Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and the author of Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations, Columbia University Press, 1997.

She wrote this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Posted on January 17, 2009.

Recommended Citation: Katharine H.S. Moon, “Military Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 3-6-09, January 17, 2009.

See Choe Sang-hun, “Ex-Prostitutes Say South Korea and U.S. Enabled Sex Trade Near Bases,” The New York Times, January 7, 2009.

Notes:

[1] Aida Santos, “Gathering the Dust: The Bases Issue in the Philippines,” in Let the Good Times Roll, eds. Saundra Sturdevant and Brenda Stolzfus (New York: New Press, 1992) p. 40.

[2] Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).

[3] See Katharine H.S. Moon, “South Korean Movements against Militarized Sexual Labor,” in Asian Survey (34:2), 1999.

[4] Norimitsu Onishi, “Abe only partly successful in defusing ‘comfort women’ issue,” International Herald Tribune, April 29, 2007. Access date: May 2, 2007.

[5]Yun Geumi’s body was found “naked, bloody, and covered with bruises and contusions-with laundry detergent sprinkled over the crime site. In addition, a coke bottle was embedded in Yun’s uterus and the trunk of an umbrella driven 27cm into her rectum.” From Rainbow Center, Flushing, NY, News Letter # 3, January, 1994, p. 8.

[6] For more detailed discussion, see Katharine H.S. Moon, “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties: Gender Politics in the South Korean ‘Anti-American’ Movement,” Journal of Asian Studies 66:1 (2007).

[7] Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “SACO Final Report,” December 2, 1996.

[8] For a comparative analysis of decentralization and its relationship to the U.S. military in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, Katharine H.S. Moon, “Challenging U.S. Hegemony: Asian Nationalism and Anti-Americanism in East Asia,” in The United States and East Asia: Old Issues and New Thinking, G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon, eds., (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

[9] Indianhead, October 4, 2004. (Access date: 11 January, 2009).

Posted on

“2009 International Conference against the Asia Pacific Missile Defense and for the End of Arms Race”

Updated Program as of: April 11, 2009

International Conference against the Asia Pacific Missile Defense and for the End of Arms Race

Seoul Women’s Plaza, Seoul, South Korea, April 16-18, 2009
Daily Events and Programs
(1). April 16, 2009 (Thursday): Field Trip to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Getting Acquainted (Consecutive Interpretation)

08:00-09:00: Breakfast, Seoul Women’s Plaza restaurant (3rd Fl.)

09:00: Bus leaves in front of the Seoul Women’s Plaza

10:00-16:00: Field trip to the DMZ (Mt. Dora Observatory, Imjingak, Mt. Odu Unification Observatory, a village victimized by the antipersonnel landmine) guided by Lee, Si-Woo, an internationally known photographer

: Facilitator: Lee, Si-Woo (photographer, peace activist), Lee Haeng-Woo (President of National Association of Korean Americans (NAKA) and the Chairman of Center for Korean Affairs)

17:30-19:00: Dinner, Seoul Women’s Plaza restaurant (3rd Fl.)
19:00-21:00: Getting Acquainted Time, Multi Purpose room (3rd Fl.), Seoul Women’s Plaza

: Facilitator: Dr. Park, Sung-Yong (Nonviolent Peaceforce Corea)

: Welcome Speech (5 min.) by Lee, Kang-Sil, Executive Co-Chairperson, Korean Alliance for Progressive Movement
: Greeting Speech (5 min.) by Yoshioka Tatsuya, Founder and Director, Peace Boat / Regional Initiator, GPPAC Northeast Asia
: Special Address (5 min.) by Thomas C. Sturtevant, Veterans for Peace-Korea Peace Campaign
: Special Talk/Performance (15min.) by Yumi Kikuchi, Founder of Global Peace Campaign and JUMP (Japan United for Ministry of Peace)
: Special Music Performance (15min.) by dopehead zo, musician and peace activist

(2). April 17, 2009 (Friday): International Symposium and Dinner Meeting

08:00-09:00: Breakfast, Seoul Women’s Plaza restaurant (3rd Fl.)

9:30-10:00: Registration, in front of the International Conference Hall, Seoul Women’s Plaza (1st Fl.)
10:00- 17:40: International Symposium, International Conference Hall, Seoul Women’s Plaza (1st Fl.), simultaneous interpretation)

10:00-10:40: Welcome and Keynote Speech

: Facilitator: Choi, Eun-A (Self-Reliance Reunification Committee, Korean Alliance for Progressive Movement)

10:00-10:05: Welcome speech (Chung, Hyun- Baek, President of the Board of Women Making Peace and the Co-Representative of Citizen’s Peace Forum)
10:05-10:10: Greeting speech (Dave Webb, GN Chairman)
10:10-10:15: Greeting speech (Peter van Tuijl, Executive Director, European Centre for Conflict Prevention)

10:20-10:40: Keynote speech, “US Plans for Global Dominance thru Space Control and the Global Network Response” (Bruce Gagnon, GN secretary/coordinator)

10:40-12:20: Plenary Session I “Missile Defense and the World”

: Facilitator: Cho, Young-Hee (Women Making Peace)

10:40-11:00: Obama’s Global Military Policy: Change Comes not from Policy, but from Economic Collapse (Loring Wirbel, GN board)
11:00-11:20: Missile Defense, Europe and the New Cold War (Dave Webb, GN Chairman)
11:20-11:40: Missile Defense, Arms Race and the Future of the North East Asia (Cheong, Wooksik, Peace Network)
11:40-12:00: Alternative to Missile Defense: Global Security through Conversion of the Global War Machine (Mary Beth Sullivan, GN Outreach coordinator)
12:00-12:20: Q and A
12:20-13:30: Lunch and break (Seoul Women’s Plaza restaurant (3rd Fl.)
13:30-14:00: Break for a Short Movie and Music Performance

: Facilitator: Jieun (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, (PSPD))

: Movie screening (4min.) by Pyeongtaek Peace Center
: Special music performance (20min.) by Lee, Ji-Sang (Musician, Invited professor of the SungKongHoe University)
14:00-16:10: Plenary Session II “Global Anti-War and Peace Movements”
: A ten minute speech by each international participant from various regions on the local peace movements focused on No MD and No US bases movements; and Q&A. (order undecided yet)

: Facilitator: Park, Jung-Eun (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD))

: India’s Move into Space Technology: Including the Nuclear and Space Policy of India and Pakistan (J. Narayana Rao (India), GN board)
: Scandinavian Countries and Space Warfare: Space Installations and Space Industry Serving US Space War Plans (Agneta Noberg (Sweden), GN board)
: The Cost of the US Military Bases Empire in the UK (Lindis Percy (UK), GN board)
: Korea and Nebraska-StratCom Comrades in Arms (Tim Rinne (U. S. A.), GN board)
: The Struggle against US Bases and MD in Australia (Hannah Middleton (Australia), GN board)
: The People’s Nonviolent Resistance against MD in the Czech Republic and European Solidarity Movement (Anna Polo (Italy), Europe for Peace)
: Challenge by Peace Movements in Japan to US-Japan Military-Industrial Complex: Through Opposition to the Missile Defense System and to The Basic Law on Use of Space (Koji Sugihara (Japan), No! to Nukes and Missile Defense Campaign)
: Space Invaders: Star Wars in Hawai’i (Katy Rose (Hawaii), American Friends Service Committee Hawaii Area Program and the DMZ-Hawai’i / Aloha ‘Aina network)
: The Anti-Base Peace Movements around Pyeongteaek (Kang, Sang-Won (Korea), Pyeongtaek Peace Center)
16:10-16:20: Break

16:20-17:50: Plenary Session III: The Urgent Peace Issues of the Asia Pacific

: Facilitator: Lee, Suk-Tae (Citizens’ Peace Forum)

16:20-16:40: How to Create a Non Nuclear / Non Missile Zone in Northeast Asia
(Co-speech by Atsushi Fujioka, GN board and Kazuhiko Tamaki, Vice President, Peace Depot)
____ “Why Is Japan’s First Missile Defense—Proposed Shooting Down of the DPRK’s Space Rocket a Tragic Mistake? : Learning from the Elimination of European Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles Treaty of 1988, and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” (Atsushi Fujioka)
____”Model Treaty for the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” (Kazuhiko Tamaki)
16:40-17:00: Basing Without Bases (Corazon Valdez-Fabros, International Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military Bases (No Bases Network))
17:00-17:20: Possible Impact to Regional Peace and Disarmament of “Peace-State” Transformation (Francis Daehoon Lee, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD))
17:20-17:40: Q & A
17:40-18:00: Co-Statement for Peace, Seoul, 2009 (By an international and a Korean participant, TBA)
18:00: Closing the Symposium: Facilitator: TBA
18:00-21:00: Dinner and Conversation, Restaurant, ‘Myungkyung Live’ near Seoul Women’s plaza (Consecutive interpretation)

: Co-Facilitator: Mary Beth Sullivan (GN Outreach coordinator) and Choi, Sung-Hee (Korean committee member)

: Speech on the Peace of the East Asia and the issue of the Yasukuni (5 min.) by Suh, Sung, Director of Ritsumeikan Center for Korea Studies (RiCKS) and Professor of Law, Korean resident in Japan
: Co-Speech on the World March For Peace and Nonviolence (7 min.) by Dennis Redmond (Director of World Without Wars/USA) and Dr. Park, Sung Yong(Nonviolent Peaceforce Corea)

(3) April 18, 2009 (Saturday): GN Annual Strategy & Business Meeting and Pyeongtaek Visit

08:00-09:00: Breakfast, Seoul Women’s Plaza restaurant (3rd Fl.)

9:00-12:00: GN Annual Strategy and Business Meeting (English, open to everyone) Multi Purpose Room, 4th Fl., Seoul Women’s Plaza

: Facilitator: Bruce Gagnon (GN Secretary/Coordinator)
12:00-13:00: Lunch, Seoul Women’s Plaza restaurant (3rd Fl.)
13:00: Leaving Seoul for Pyeongaek by bus (in front of the Seoul Women’s Plaza)

15:00-20:00: Pyeongtaek Visit (the emerging hub of US military bases in construction) and Dinner Meeting with the Local Peace Organizations (Consecutive interpretation)

: Facilitator: Kang, Sang-Won (Pyeongtaek Peace Center) and Pyeongtaek Peace activists

15:00-16:00: Rally in front of the Beta Base, Songtan Air Force Base (known as Osan AFB)
16:00-18:30: Field trip to the Songtan AFB
18:30-20:00: Dinner meeting
20:00- 22:00 Return to Seoul

(4) Special Event (Optional):
Visit and Field Trip to the Site of Struggle against the Mugeon-ri Military Training Fields on April 19

The Pan-Korean Committee against the Expansion of the Mugeon-ri Military Training Fields (http://www.peaceoh.net, (Korean)), and The Village People’s Committee against the Expansion of the Mugeon-ri Military Training Fields specially sponsor the international participants’ visit and field trip to Ohyun-ri and Mugeon-ri. (consecutive translation)

13:00: Bus leaves in front of the Seoul Women’s Plaza

14:30-16:30 Workshop
16:30-18:00 Trip to the Mugeon-ri Military Training Fields
18:00-20:00 Dinner meeting with the local activists
20:00-21:00 Candle light vigil with the village people
21:00-22:30 Return to Seoul

(5) The GPPAC Steering Committee Meeting on April 18~19

Morning of April 18 and all day April 19, Seminar Room No. 2, Seoul Women’s Plaza.

======

“2009 International Conference against the Asia Pacific Missile Defense and for the End of Arms Race”(Tentative title)

1. Background and Greetings

The 17th annual conference of the Global Network against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space is held in Seoul, Korea from April 16 to April 18, 2009, under the tentative title of the 2009 International Conference against the Asia Pacific Missile Defense and for the End of Arms Race. The conference focuses on the Asia Pacific missile defense and for the end of arms race.

The Korean committee for the conference, lead by the Peace Network (http://www.peacekorea.org/index.php(Korean), http://www.peacekorea.org/english/(English))

and Center for Peace and Disarmament, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD) (http://blog.peoplepower21.org/Peace/(Korean),

http://blog.peoplepower21.org/Peace/category/English(English) and is formed by 10 peace organizations is the Co-Sponsor with the Global Network against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space(http://www.space4peace.org) for this conference.

The signs of a ‘new cold war’ are brewing as the U.S. pushes ahead with the missile defense (MD) system installations in Eastern Europe against Russia’s strong opposition. There is an urgent need for the international civil society to respond against the current rapid arms race in the Asia Pacific where the US leads the Asia Pacific MD efforts, supported strongly by Japan, Australia and South Korea; against the frontline of opposition formed by China, Russia and North Korea.

The MD issue is becoming the core element of the destabilization of peace in Northeast Asia, not to mention the Korean peninsula, especially when the U.S. intends to make South Korea its MD outpost and the Lee Myung Bak government promotes stronger US-South Korea alliance and the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral system formation.

By this great chance, the Korea Committee points out the Korean peace issues within the international peace movement circles, and wants to share international understanding and cooperation about Korean peninsula’s peace and reunification issues.

In light of such concerns, holding an international peace conference in South Korea on missile defense and arms race issues will provide an important momentum in bringing the issues pertaining to the Korean peninsula-one of the last divided countries by the cold war in the world- and the North East Asia to the international community and in developing international solidarity.

We, the Korea Committee is already excited and grateful by many international participants’ enthusiasm to participate. Above all, we, the Korean Committee welcomes everyone in the world, who wants to share the urgent issues in each country regarding the Missile defense, military base, arms race etc. issues and to promote further international solidarity one another.

2. Summary of the International Conference

Official event dates: April 16 to 18, 2009

_Core issues: MD and space weaponization; Arms race and arms reduction; US bases and the peace movement in Northeast Asia; and global meaning of the peaceful reunification process in Korea etc.

_Main events: International symposium (Seoul), International news conference (Seoul), Visit to Panmunjeom, Peace campaign (Pyeongtaek) and GN annual strategy and business meeting (Seoul)

_ Interpretation: International symposium will be translated in Korean and English simultaneously while the other programs will be done consecutively. The GN annual strategy and business meeting will be done in English. For the effective usage of time, we integrated the whole program rather than having separate workshops.

3. Daily events and programs of the GN International Conference(Consecutive Interpretation)

(1). April 16, 2009 (Thursday):

09:00(07:00)-15:00(17:30): International participants trip to Panmunjeom(the symbol of Korean division, http://koreadmztour.com/english/tour/tour2.htm) or Visit to the vicinity of the DMZ(Imjingak, Dorasan observatory etc.)/meeting with activists/cultural event etc as a plan B

18:00-21:00: dinner and entertainment(including the speech by 3~4 GN participants)

(2). April 17, 2009 (Friday): International meeting (Simultaneous interpretation)

9:00-10:00 Foreign and domestic press conference (consecutive translation)

9:45-10:00: Registration

10:00-10:10: Welcome speech (Korean dignitary)

10:10-10:20: Greeting speech (GN Chairman )

10:20-10:40: Keynote speech, “Star Wars (space weaponization), Future Warfare, and the Global Peace” (GN)

10:40-12:20: Plenary session I “MD and the World”

10:40-11:00: The MD policy of the overall and Obama government (USA participant)

11:00-11:20: MD, Europe and the New Cold War including the NATO missile defense(European participant): 11:20-11:40: MD, Arms Race and the Future of the North East Asia(Korean participant):

11:40-12:00: What is the alternative against the MD?: Nuclear Disarmament and Conversion of the Military Industrial Complex(GN participant)

12:00-12:20: Q and A

12:20-14:00: Lunch and break (There will be short presentation(about 4min.) of the slide projection )

14:00-15:20: Plenary session II “Global Anti-War and Peace Movements”

* Each international participant requested to give a ten minute speech on the MD and No US bases movements; and Q&A. The participants from GN are cordially asked to give a speech.

15:20-15:30: Break

15:30-17:00: Plenary session III ” Korea, Japan and the Northeast Asia Peace

15:30-16:00: Peace Constitution in Japan and the Northeast Asia Peace (Japanese participant):

16:00-16:30: Korea Peace and Reunification Process and the Northeast Asia Peace (Korean participant): ?

16:30-17:00: Q& A

17:00: Closing the symposium

18:00-21:00: Dinner and Entertainment: includes three Keynote speeches

(3) April 18, 2009(Saturday)(English)

9:00-12:00: GN Annual Strategy and Business Meeting

12:00-13:00: Lunch

13:00-20:00: visit and rally/ protest in front of the military base in Pyeongtaek (the emerging hub of US military bases in construction) and dinner meeting with the local peace organizations

(4). Official Conference and Stay site : Seoul Women’s Plaza, Seoul, from April 15 to April 19(During the given official dates above, no stay cost by the international participants. The Korean Committee is reserving seven western-style two-bed rooms and seven Korean-style two bed rooms except for the special request. The rooms are the building can best afford. Reservation for the first comers, first. The international participant may pay for other nights at low cost or request for the info. of home stay/ other hotels as alternative. Regarding stay, please contact wooksik@gmail.com, armha5156@gmail.com and globalnet@mindspring.com
Jan. 20, 2009

The Korean Committee for the international conference, Seoul, 2009(Tentative title)

Korean Organizations in the Korean Committee(No order, List in formation)

Peace Network

Center for Peace and Disarmament, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD)

National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea

Women Making Peace

Pyeongtaek Peace Center

Civil Committee against the Kunsan U.S. base

Jinbo Korea

Lawyers for a Democratic Society

People’s Solidarity for Social Progress

Nonviolent Peaceforce Korea

Arirang International Peace Foundation

Posted on

Security Without Empire: National Organizing Conference on Foreign Military Bases

Security Without Empire:

National Organizing Conference on Foreign Military Bases

American University,

Washington, D.C.

Feb. 27-Mar. 2, 2009

Join Us at the Security Without Empire Conference

There is a sense of relief that many here in the U.S. feel after the presidential election, but we understand this is a time to step up our organizing for peace and economic justice—including the growing movement to close and withdraw the nearly 1,000 U.S. military bases located in foreign nations.

From Okinawa and Guam to Honduras, Germany, Iraq, and beyond people who have suffered from the abuses inherent to foreign military bases have been calling for their withdrawal. People in the U.S. have joined this call, outraged by the damage done by U.S. bases abroad and by their expense, which diverts $138 billion a year from addressing human needs and revitalizing our economy.

Representatives of 15 organizations have come together to organize a national conference for the closing and withdrawal of military bases. The goals of the conference are:

• Share information about U.S. foreign military bases and resistance;

• Develop new strategies and expand the U.S. anti-bases movement;

• Integrate anti-bases organizing into a more coherent movement;

• Raise the visibility of the U.S. and international anti-bases movements;

• Apply pressure on Congress;

• Close and reduce the number of foreign bases.

The conference will feature base opponents from many “host” nations and will include leading activists as keynote speakers, panelists and workshop facilitators.

Monday, March 2, will be a lobbying day on Capitol Hill, in which we encourage as many conference attendees as possible to participate. We’ll provide talking points and group leaders.

For more info contact:

GGold@afsc.org

(617) 661-6130.

National Project on U.S. Military Bases

www.projectonmilitarybases.org
National Project on U.S. Military Bases

Participating Organizations:

• American Friends Service Committee
• American University Department of Anthropology
• CodePink
• Fellowship of Reconciliation
• Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space
• Granny Peace Brigade
• Institute for Leadership Development and Study of Pacific Asian North American Religion at Pacific School of Religion
• Institute for Policy Studies
• International Women’s Network Against Militarism
• Peace Action
• Southwest Workers Union
• U.S. Peace Council
• United for Peace & Justice
• Veterans For Peace
• Women for Genuine Security

www.projectonmilitarybases.org

Posted on

Japanese citizens Open Letter to President Elect Obama

Concerned Japanese citizens send an open letter to President Obama

“Are you reviewing and changing Bush-Rumsfeld military posture?”

Dear friends of peace in the United States,

January 16, 2009

We, concerned citizens from the Japanese archipelago, are sending an open letter to Mr. Barak Obama on the occasion of his inauguration as President of the United States, asking him to clarify whether and how far he is going to “change” the Bush administration’s military posture and strategy toward East Asia and the Pacific. More than 100 citizens, many from peace and other social movement groups, have signed it. More are signing now. (The open letter is annexed.)

As we state in our letter, we understand that his promise of “change” is a commitment not only to American citizens but also to people all over the world who suffered under the Bush administration’s destructive actions. In concrete, we are eager to know whether Mr. Obama will fundamentally review and retract the Bush-Rumsfeld’s global military strategy, the so-called Defense Transformation Program, particularly its East Asia and Pacific version centering on the Japan-U.S. military alliance.

The U.S. military presence in East Asia and Pacific region has been drastically reinforced and the Japanese remilitarization accelerated to serve the purposes of Bush’s global and permanent “war on terror” and spurring the Japanese rightists’ drive to glorify the imperial Japanese past and revise the pacifist constitution. What has been done in the past eight years in this respect serves only to destabilize this region and lead to new arms race among the countries involved. The U.S.-Japan military buildup program is met by vigorous and sustained protests of citizens, particularly in areas affected by reinforcement of U.S. bases such as Okinawa, Iwakuni, Yokosuka, Zama and Yokota. Time is ripe for the United States to fundamentally review its military posture and presence in East Asia and the Pacific as well as in the rest of the world.

We have great respect to the wisdom of U.S. citizens who opted for change by electing Mr. Obama President. We hope that you will share our concern, endorse this open letter, and circulate it widely among the change-aspiring American people who voted for Mr. Obama. Our hope is to build a bridge of peace and demilitarization across the Pacific so that a real change will come.

Hikaru Kasahara,
For the steering committee of People’s Plan Study Group (PPSG)

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Contacts for your responses and endorsements to the open letter to President Obama
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
People’s Plan Study Group (PPSG), Tokyo
Shinseido Bldg.2F, Sekiguchi 1-44-3,
Bunkyoku, Tokyo 112-0014
Tel: +81-3-6424-5748 Fax:+81-3-6424-5749
Email: ppsg@jca.apc.org
URL: http://www.peoples-plan.org/
English Media: http://www.ppjaponesia.org/
………………………………………

For details of U.S.-Japan military arrangements made under the Bush administration, please refer:

“Japan’s Willing Military Annexation by the United States — ‘Alliance for the Future’ and Grassroots Resistance” (by Muto Ichiyo) http://www.ppjaponesia.org/
“Okinawa Disagree — A Historic Turning Point in the Struggle for Peace and Dignity” (by Yui Akiko) in /Japonesia Review No.2/, December 2006, published by PPSG
“Okinawa’s Resistance Reaches a New Height on Falsification of History and U.S. Bases” (by Yui Akiko) in /Japonesia Review No.4/, March 2008, published by PPSG
“From Okinawa — Breaking the Imposed Myth: Permanence of U.S. Bases in Okinawa” (by Yui Akiko) http://www.ppjaponesia.org/
“People of Yokosuka Resists U.S. Nuclear Carrier” (by Yamaguchi Hibiki) in /Japonesia Review No.5/, October 2008, published by PPSG
“Rural People Resist U.S. Military Encroachment — From Takae, Okinawa” (by Hikaru Kasahara) in /Japonesia Review No.5/, October 2008, published by PPPSG

*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-
An Open Letter to U.S. President Barack Obama

The “Change” You Promised Should Include the Official Dismantling
of the Bush-Rumsfeld Neoconservative Military Strategy
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-

President Barack Obama
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

January 16, 2009

Dear Mr. President:

First, we would like to extend our congratulations on your election as President of the United States of America.

The Bush administration, by conducting wars forbidden under international law, and by taking other unilateralist actions during its eight years in office, has brought immense suffering to the people of the world. We welcome your election as President, as you clearly promised to change what had been done by your predecessor and his administration. We believe that your call for change won the hearts and minds of the American people, particularly the young, inspired them with hope, and rekindled idealism, undoubtedly a great virtue of the American citizenry, beyond color, gender, class and other differences. We heartily welcome your victory.

We nevertheless feel it urgent, as residents of the Japanese archipelago, to remind you, Mr. President, that your promise of “change” should be a commitment not only to American citizens but also to people all over the world who suffered under the Bush administration’s destructive unilateralist actions. We, as people who long to be liberated from the endless war situation created by the Bush administration, are eager to know how you plan to change the global military strategy that it formulated and implemented. In particular, we are carefully watching whether you will dismantle the Bush-Rumsfeld military strategy, centering on the so-called Defense Transformation Program, which bears the indelible hallmark of neoconservatism, and will introduce instead more modest and decent U.S. foreign and defense policies.

We would like to know whether you intend to embark on a fundamental review of the U.S. military strategy along this line.

Specifically, as peace loving citizens of the Japanese archipelago, we expect and request you to bring a fundamental change to the U.S. military strategy in East Asia and the Pacific region.

Under the Bush administration, Japan has been fully integrated into the U.S. global military strategy which is dedicated to the goal of U.S. global domination and serves exclusively the military, political, and economic interests of the United States as defined by the then neocon rulers. In other words, the strategy that Japan was integrated into has nothing to do with Japan’s defense or peace in Asia. Through a series of bilateral arrangements signed from 2005 through 2006, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, a military force which exists in violation of the Japanese constitution, were placed directly under the U.S. command as auxiliary units to serve Bush’s wars, under the plausible slogan of a “mature alliance.” Under the new agreements, the Japanese and U.S. governments are forcing the construction of new military facilities in Okinawa, and these attempts are being fiercely contested by local people. U.S. military bases are also being reinforced in Japanese mainland cities and towns such as Iwakuni, Yokosuka, Zama and Yokota, but again, local residents are struggling against these moves. By pressing Japan’s rapid militarization and its incorporation into the U.S. global strategy, and thus forcing Japan to revise its pacifist constitution, the U.S. government under President Bush has been blatantly interfering in Japanese domestic affairs. The U.S. has also attempted to turn Guam into a huge U.S. military complex as a cornerstone for the U.S. forces’ global strategic deployment, using Japanese tax money.

The military arrangement thus introduced by the Bush administration is counterproductive, as it not only will fail to bring about peace and security to Asia and the Pacific region, but may lead to an aggravated arms race with China and usher in a new Cold War situation in Asia.

We therefore request that you seriously consider and adopt the concrete proposals articulated below. We believe that the “change” you promised will not be substantiated unless these are met.

  1. Fundamentally review and abolish the bilateral arrangement contained in the “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” agreed on October 29, 2005 and the related subsequent military arrangements between the U.S. and Japan, and freeze the ongoing construction of military facilities and the transformation of military forces based on the arrangements.
  2. Review and stop the expansion of military facilities in Okinawa and review the presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa with a view to eventually withdrawing them completely.
  3. Abandon the plan for the construction of new U.S. military bases in Guam.
  4. Cease to demand or pressure Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution. Opt for regional multilateral arrangements for peace in Northeast Asia in the perspective of the withdrawal of the U.S. forces and Japan’s demilitarization and promote a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone as a first step.

We eagerly await your response to the above proposals.

Sincerely,
signed by:

Hokkaido Peace Network
Kansai District Collective Action Network
Study Group on the United Nation and Japanese Constitution
Forum for Human Rights, Justice and Solidarity for Peace
Solidarity with Anti-War Military Personnel
Buddhists No War Group, Fukuoka
Group to Substantiate the Fukuoka Court Ruling on Unconstitutionality of Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine
Action Committee against US-Japan Security Pact
No! to Nukes and Missile Defense Campaign
EcPeaceClub
SPACE ALLIES
Asian Pace Alliance (APA) Japan
People’s Plan Study Group (PPSG)

Myoukei Nakata, Kentaro Nakata, Tsuneo Takeichi, Megumi Ishibashi, Kenji Kunitomi, Kitarou Wada, , Kazuhiro Nishii, Hideaki Nishiya, Hidenori Ao, Hideyuki Kuroda, Makoto Sakai, Sachiko Kunimitsu, Shizue Hirota, Teramachi Ayumu, Kolin Kobayashi, Shigeki Konno, Yoshikazu Makishi, Hiroshi Kajino, Mitsumasa Ohta, Naoya Arakawa, Yoko Yamaguchi, Yumi Honda, Takashi Ozawa, Fumitaka Miyahara, Makiko Sato, Kaori Suzuki, Koichi Bessho, Asita mo hare – Seiko Ohki, Sachiko Taba, Yukio Kurihara, Masahide Tsuruta, Shutaro Hosono, Yuuko Nakamura, Akiko Inari, Hiroko Taguti, Kiyokazu Koshida, Yukinobu Aoyagi, Yuko Inoue, Mitsue Sugiyama, Hideaki Kuno, Kenji Ago, Kazumasa Igata, Kazuhiro Katou, Tomoko Miyahara, Takao Watahiki, Yuko Inui, Hisashi Senba, Mutsuo Usami, Setsuko Usami, Yumi Kikuchi, Kamiya Fusako, Takako Morimoto, Hiroshi Yoshikawa, Akemi Ishii, Yasuo Kuwano, Kouitirou Toyosima, Yuuichi Aoki, Kenichi Hanamura, Keiko Tanaka, Marie Nakajima, Kimio Oda, Takashi Sano, Hatuko Sano, Tetsuo Matumura, Morioka shingo, Tosiko Kamakura, Toshimasa Sakakura, Keiko Doi, Yasushi Furuya , Keiko Kimura, Masao Kimura, Rosan Daido, Yuzuru Nakazawa, Mieko Iwasaki, Toshiaki Ikeo, Shiro Saka, Kiyoshi Owa, Isamu Nagano, Junko Yamaguchi, Koji Sugihara, Terumi Terao, Noriko Kyogoku, Yasue Tanaka, Ayako Nakanishi, Shu-ichi Satoh, Hikaru Kanesaki, Seiko Miyake, Junko Okura, Sojun Taira (as of January 13, 2009)

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Action Alert to Oppose nomination of Adm. Blair to top Intelligence post

ETAN Action ALERT

Urge Your Senators to Oppose the nomination of former Adm. Dennis Blair

Tell Your Senator: Nation’s Top Intelligence Post Must Go to Someone Who Respects Human Rights – Not Admiral Blair!

Call your Senators and tell them that you oppose the confirmation of Admiral Dennis Blair as President Obama’s Director of National Intelligence. Call today toll free at 800-828-0498/800-473-6711 and e-mail them via the Senate website ( http://senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm).

Talking Points

Adm. Blair has a poor human rights record. As head of the Pacific Command, he demonstrated a disregard for crimes against humanity committed against the East Timorese in 1999 and undermined executive and congressional efforts to support human rights in Indonesian-occupied East Timor.

The Senator should oppose Adm. Blair’s nomination as Director of National Intelligence. The post must go to someone who respects human rights and is committed to justice and accountability.

Please let us know if you acted on this alert and any response you receive. Also contact us with any questions – etan@etan.org.

Write a letter to the editor of you local newspapers. See sample letters at http://www.etan.org/action/2006/29alert.htm#Sample .

Background

The Director of National Intelligence coordinates all U.S. intelligence agencies. The post requires Senate confirmation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command from February 1999 to May 2002, Admiral Dennis Blair was the highest ranking U.S. military official in the region during the period of East Timor’s independence referendum at the end of Indonesia’s violent occupation. During that time he undermined the Clinton administration’s belated efforts to support human rights and self-determination in the Indonesian-occupied territory and opposed congressional efforts to limit military assistance. Blair’s troubling record on East Timor demonstrates that he puts maintaining a relationship with the worst human rights violators above justice and accountability.

In early April 1999, Blair met in Jakarta with General Wiranto, then the Defense Minister and the commander of Indonesian forces. Dozens of refugees in a Catholic church in Liquica, East Timor, were hacked to death by militia members backed by the Indonesian military (including the notorious Kopassus Special Forces) just two days before in a well-publicized massacre.

Instead of pressuring Wiranto to shut down the militias, Blair promised new military assistance, which the Indonesian military “took as a green light to proceed with the militia operation,” according to Allan Nairn, writing in the Nation magazine. In fact just weeks later on April 17, refugees from the attack in Liquicia were again attacked and killed in the capital Dili. The next day, Blair phoned Wiranto and again failed to tell him to stop the killing and shut the military’s militia proxies down.

According to journalist Nairn, classified cables summarizing the meeting and the call, say that Admiral Blair “told the armed forces chief that he looks forward to the time when [the army will] resume its proper role as a leader in the region. He invited General Wiranto to come to Hawaii as his guest… [Blair] expects that approval will be granted to send a small team to provide technical assistance to… selected TNI [Indonesian military] personnel on crowd control measures.”

The link between the militia and the military was clear to the U.S. at the time. Princeton University’s Bradley Simpson writes, “According to top secret CIA intelligence summary issued after the [Liquica] massacre…. (and recently declassified by the author through a Freedom of Information Act request), ‘Indonesian military had colluded with pro-Jakarta militia forces in events preceding the attack and were present in some numbers at the time of the killings.'”

The Washington Post’s Dana Priest reported that in the bloody aftermath of East Timor’s independence vote, , “Blair and other U.S. military officials took a forgiving view of the violence surrounding the referendum in East Timor. Given the country’s history, they argued, it could have been worse.”

U.S.-trained Indonesian military officers were among those involved in crimes against humanity in East Timor. “But at no point, Blair acknowledges, did he or his subordinates reach out to the Indonesian contacts trained through IMET or JCET [U.S.-funded military training programs] to try to stop the brewing crisis,” wrote Priest. “It is fairly rare that the personal relations made through an IMET course can come into play in resolving a future crisis,” Blair told Priest.

General Wiranto was indicted in February 2003 by a UN-backed court in East Timor for his command role in the 1999 violence. The attack on the Liquica church is among the crimes against humanity cited in the indictment. He is currently a leading candidate for President of Indonesia in elections to take place next year.

Additional background and links can be found at http://etan.org/news/2009/01blair.htm .

For additional action ideas or to link to this alert – http://www.etan.org/action/2006/29alert.htm
John M. Miller fbp@igc.org
National Coordinator
East Timor & Indonesia Action Network (ETAN)
PO Box 21873, Brooklyn, NY 11202-1873 USA
Phone: (718)596-7668 Mobile phone: (917)690-4391
Skype: john.m.miller
Web site: http://www.etan.org

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No military honors for PTSD sufferers

January 8, 2009

Purple Heart Is Ruled Out for Traumatic Stress

By LIZETTE ALVAREZ and ERIK ECKHOLM

The Pentagon has decided that it will not award the Purple Heart, the hallowed medal given to those wounded or killed by enemy action, to war veterans who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder because it is not a physical wound.

The decision, made public on Tuesday, for now ends the hope of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who have the condition and believed that the Purple Hearts could honor their sacrifice and help remove some of the stigma associated with the condition.

The disorder, which may go unrecognized for months or years, can include recurring nightmares, uncontrolled rage and, sometimes, severe depression and suicide. Soldiers grappling with PTSD are often unable to hold down jobs.

In May, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said awarding Purple Hearts to such service members was “clearly something that needs to be looked at,” after he toured a mental health center at Fort Bliss, Tex.

But a Pentagon advisory group decided against the award because, it said, the condition had not been intentionally caused by enemy action, like a bomb or bullet, and because it remained difficult to diagnose and quantify.

“Historically, the Purple Heart has never been awarded for mental disorders or psychological conditions resulting from witnessing or experiencing traumatic combat events,” said Eileen Lainez, a Pentagon spokeswoman. “Current medical knowledge and technologies do not establish PTSD as objectively and routinely as would be required for this award at this time.”

One in five service members, or at least 300,000, suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or major depression, according to a Rand Corporation study in 2008.

For some soldiers suffering from the disorder, the historical distinction between blood and no blood in an injury fails to recognize the depths of their mental scars. A modern war – one fought without safe havens and with the benefit of improved armor – calls for a new definition of injuries, some veterans say.

Kevin Owsley, 47, who served in the Ohio National Guard in 2004 as a gunner on a Humvee and who is being treated for PTSD and traumatic brain injury, said he disagreed with the Pentagon’s ruling.

Unable to hold a job, Mr. Owsley supports his family on disability payments. This week he told his Veterans Affairs doctor he was fighting back suicidal impulses, something he has struggled with since his return. “You relive it every night and every day,” he said. “You dream about it. You can see it, taste it, see people getting killed constantly over and over.”

“It is a soldier’s injury,” he said, angrily, in a telephone interview on Wednesday.

But many soldiers do not feel that way. In online debates and interviews they expressed concern that the Purple Heart would be awarded to soldiers who faked symptoms to avoid combat or receive a higher disability rating from the Department of Veterans Affairs.

“I’m glad they finally got something right,” said Jeremy Rausch, an Army staff sergeant who saw some of the Iraq War’s fiercest fighting in Adhamiya in 2006 and 2007. “PTSD can be serious, but there is absolutely no way to prove that someone truly is suffering from it or faking it.”

The Purple Heart in its modern form was established by Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1932. Some 1.7 million service members have received the medal, and, as of last August, 2,743 service members who served in Afghanistan and 33,923 who fought in Iraq had received the award.

The medal entitles veterans to enhanced benefits, including exemptions from co-payments for veterans hospital and outpatient care and gives them higher priority in scheduling appointments.

The Pentagon left open the possibility that it could revisit the issue.

But a Pentagon-supported service group, the Military Order of the Purple Heart, has strongly opposed expanding the definition to include psychological symptoms, saying it would “debase” the honor.

“Would you award it to anyone who suffered the effects of chemicals or for other diseases and illnesses?” John E. Bircher III, director of public relations for the group, said Wednesday. “How far do you want to take it?”

Post-traumatic stress disorder was first identified during the Vietnam War and has gradually been accepted as a serious psychological problem for some who experience violence and fear.

Dr. Barbara V. Romberg, a psychologist in Bethesda, Md., and founder of Give an Hour, which offers mental health services to troops and their families, said that she and many other psychologists believed the discussion of Purple Hearts had brought more attention to post-traumatic stress disorder and the seriousness of psychological wounds suffered on the battlefield.

“We’re working to normalize post-traumatic stress as an understandable human consequence of war that can result in very serious damage to some people’s lives, and they deserve honoring for that,” she said.

“But I don’t want to be so quick to condemn the decision,” she added.

Many have post-traumatic stress, but only some develop a serious lasting disorder; in both cases, she said, “people deserve to be honored in some way for the injury they received in combat.”

After years of criticism for ignoring the problem, the Defense Department and the Veterans Administration have bolstered their capacity to diagnose and treat PTSD, and those with serious cases may receive substantial disability benefits. Some of those suffering from severe traumatic brain injuries qualify for a Purple Heart because they required medical treatment.

But in its decision not to extend Purple Hearts to PTSD sufferers, first reported Tuesday by Stars and Stripes, the Pentagon said part of the problem stemmed from the difficulty in objectively diagnosing the disorder.

That decision was made in November. It was not clear why the Pentagon did not announce the decision then.

There have been recent changes in awarding Purple Hearts. The criteria was expanded in 2008 to include all prisoners of war who died in captivity, including those who were tortured. “There were wounds there,” Mr. Bircher said.

“You have to had shed blood by an instrument of war at the hands of the enemy of the United States,” he said. “Shedding blood is the objective.”

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/us/08purple.html?th=&emc=th&pagewanted=print

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“An Acceptable Presence”: The New US Basing Structure in the Philippines

“An Acceptable Presence”: The New US Basing Structure in the Philippines

By Herbert Docena *

Sixteen years ago, the Philippine Senate made the historic vote to shut down what American analysts once described as “probably the most important basing complex in the world” — the US military bases in Subic and Clark, along with other smaller support and communications facilities in the country.

Taken after long and emotional debates, the Senate vote shook the Philippines’ relations with its most important ally. That one small and weak country could say no to what by then had become the world’s only remaining superpower reverberated across the world.

Since then, every move by the US military in the Philippines has provoked controversy. For the most part, however, the question has tended to be framed in terms of whether the US is seeking to re-establish the kind of bases it had in the past. Such framing has consequently allowed the US and Philippine governments to categorically deny any such plans.

But what has since emerged is not a return to the past but a new and different kind of basing.

GLOBAL POSTURE

Since the end of the Cold War, but in a process that has accelerated since the Bush administration came to office, the United States has embarked on what American officials tout as the most radical reconfiguration since World War II of its “global defense posture.”

This term no longer refers simply to the over 850 physical bases and installations that the US now maintains in around 46 countries around the world.[1] As US Defense undersecretary for policy Douglas J Feith explained, “We are not talking only about basing, we’re talking about the ability of our forces to operate when and where they are needed.”[2]

Billed as the “Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy,” the plan seeks to comprehensively transform the US overseas military presence – largely unchanged since the 1950s – in light of perceived new threats and the US’ self-avowed “grand strategy” of perpetuating its status as the world’s only military superpower.

“The [US] military,” declared President George W Bush, “must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.”[3] To do this, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, an official document required by the US Congress of the Pentagon to articulate US military strategy, states that the US is seeking to move away from “obsolete Cold War garrisons” to “mobile, expeditionary operations.”[4]

REDUCED FOOTPRINT

The plan is simple: Instead of concentrating its troops and equipment in only a few locations, the United States will decrease the number of large well-equipped bases and increase the number of smaller, simpler bases in more locations.[5]

Marine Gen. James Jones, commander of US forces in Europe, described the aim as developing a “family of bases” that could go “from cold to warm to hot if you need them” but without having the “small town USA”-feel, complete with schools and families that have typically come with such bases.[6]

Recognition of the rising opposition to the US military presence around the world is also driving these changes. As early as in 1988, a US government commission created during the Reagan administration concluded that, “We have found it increasingly difficult, and politically costly to maintain bases.”[7]

Apart from those in the Philippines, US bases have been closed or terminated in recent years in Puerto Rico, Panama, and recently Ecuador, as a result of public mobilizations. Turkey refused to allow the US to use its bases for the invasion in Iraq. Even in Japan and Korea, hostility to bases has been growing.

Hence, the US has been trying to restructure its overseas presence in a way that aims to undermine this growing opposition. As US Navy Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, the Joint Staff’s deputy director for strategy and policy said, “We don’t want to be stepping all over our host nations…We want to exist in a very non-intrusive way.”[8]

The aim, according to the Pentagon, is to “reduce the forward footprint” of the military while increasing its agility and flexible.[9]

MISSION PRESENCE

As part of this over-all reconfiguration, the Pentagon now categorizes its overseas structures into three: Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). (See Box 1 below.)

Box 1: CATEGORIES OF US OVERSEAS MILITARY STRUCTURES

– Main Operating Bases (MOB) are those relatively larger installations and facilities located in the territory of reliable allies, with vast infrastructure and family support facilities that will serve as the hub of operations in support of smaller, more austere bases; examples are the Ramstein Air Base in Germany, the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Camp Humphreys in Korea

– Forward Operating Sites (FOS) are smaller, more spare bases that could be expanded and then scaled down as needed; they will store pre-positioned equipment but will only normally host a small number of troops on a rotational, as opposed to permanent, basis; while smaller, they must still be able to quickly support a range of operations with back-up from MOBs

– Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) are facilities owned by host governments that would only be used by the US in case of actual operations; though they could be visited and inspected by the US, they would most likely be ran and maintained by host-nation personnel or even private contractors; useful for pre-positioning logistics support or as venues for joint operations with host militaries, they may also be expanded to become FOSs if necessary

Source: US Department of Defense, “Strengthening US Global Defense Posture,” September 2004
FOSs and CSLs are also called “lily pads” intended to allow the US to hop from MOBs to their destinations rapidly when needed but without requiring a lot of resources to keep them running when not needed.[10] Referring to this kind of base, Gen. Jones said, “We could use it for six months, turn off the lights, and go to another base if we need to.”[11]

But, as mentioned earlier, the US definition of “global posture” goes way beyond physical structures. In an effort to maximize its forward presence while minimizing opposition, the US has also been seeking to increase what US Air Force-sponsored analysts call “mission presence” and “limited access.” “Mission presence” is what the US has in countries where there are ongoing military missions which “lack the breadth and capability to qualify as true forward presence but nonetheless contribute to the overall US posture abroad.” “Limited access” is the kind the United States gets through exercises, visits, and other operations.[12]

Hence, the US’ global posture encompasses, by definition, not just those who are “forward-based,” or those units that are stationed in foreign countries on a long-term basis such as troops in Korea and Japan, but also those who are “forward-deployed,” or those who are sent overseas to conduct various kinds of deployments, exercises, or operations.

THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO COMPETE

If, in the Cold War, the US’ overseas presence targeted the Soviet Union and other communist and nationalist forces in the Third World, today, the US’ current “global posture” is aimed at any state or non-state forces perceived to be threatening the interests of the United States.

“Terrorists” stand in the line of fire. Regional powers hostile to the United States, such as Iran and North Korea, have also been singled out. But, in light of the United States’ self-declared grand strategy of preventing the rise of rivals who could threaten its preeminent status, one rising power is now clearly in its sights – China.

For years, American officials have been divided between those who believe that China could be a “strategic partner” to be engaged and those who believe that it is a “strategic competitor” to be confronted militarily before it grows more powerful. Since the end of the Cold War, indications are that the latter view has prevailed.

As early as 1997, the Pentagon’s QDR had already identified China, along with Russia, as possible “global peer competitors.”[13] In 1999, a pivotal Pentagon think-tank conducted a seminar to lay down all the likely scenarios involving China. Its conclusion: no matter what happens, China’s rise will not be “peaceful” for the US.

In 2000, a US Air Force-funded study argued explicitly in favor of preventing China’s rise. Also in the same year, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two influential commentators whose ideas have evidently molded US policy, proposed that Beijing – along with Baghdad – should be targeted for “regime-change.”[14] The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a grouping whose members and proposals have since staffed and shaped the Bush administration and its policies, supported the same aims and made similar recommendations.

During the US presidential elections, George W. Bush distinguished himself from other candidates by singling out China as a “strategic competitor.” Since then, various officials have successively warned that China’s military modernization constitutes a direct threat to the United States.[15]

The Pentagon’s 2006 official report to Congress on China stated, “China’s military expansion is already such as to alter regional military balances.”[16]

If in 2001 the QDR was still vaguely worded, by 2006, when the next QDR was released, the assessment became more explicit: “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States…”[17]

MOVING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The problem for the US is its relatively weak presence in Asia. As a Pentagon report on China, whose conclusions have been widely echoed, warned: “Lack of forward operating bases or cooperative allies greatly limits the range of US military responses…”[18]

What the US does have in terms of presence is now believed to be concentrated in the wrong place. Since the 1950s, the bulk of the US forward-presence in Asia has been in South Korea and Japan, directed towards the Soviet Union and North Korea. To address this, the US has been seeking expand southwards – to Southeast Asia.[19]

By early 2002, the US began negotiating with various governments in Southeast Asia for use of bases in the region.[20] In 2003, then US Pacific Command chief Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, stated, “Power projection and contingency response in Southeast Asia in the future will depend on this network of US access in areas with little or no permanent American basing structure.”[21]

Along with the plans for East Asia and Southeast Asia, the US had also established bases to the west of China, in Central Asia, with new installations in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.[22] While it had none before the invasion of Afghanistan, by 2002 it had access to over a dozen bases in the region.[23]

With the US forward presence northeast of China (in Japan and South Korea), the deepening cooperation with Mongolia to China’s north, and its deepening alliance with India, to China’s southwest, the United States is slowly encircling China from all sides.

It is in light of these large, sweeping changes in US strategy, its perception of threats, and its tactics, that US military objectives regarding the Philippines can be best understood.

IN THE DRAGON’S LAIR

Since the late 1990s, a chorus of American defense analysts, military officials, civilian leaders, and influential commentators have identified the Philippines as playing a critical role in the US’ global posture and a succession of studies sponsored for different US military services have singled it out for its strategic location.

The PNAC, for example, had proposed that the US Navy should establish a home-port while the US Air Force should station a wing in the Philippines.[24] Another study for the US Air Force (USAF) noted the Philippines is located firmly within what US strategists have called the “dragon’s lair” or those areas of the Western Pacific where China could potentially seek to prevent the US from deploying.[25] Another US Air Force-funded study to develop a “global access strategy” for the US Air Force proposed renting an island from the Philippines for use as a military base.[26]

A 2006 USAF-funded study evaluating basing options for storing and pre-positioning US’ war material included the Philippines as among the most desirable sites. Exploring different alternatives, a US Army-sponsored research identified the Philippines as one of the suitable locations for a new unit of the Army.

Although proposals made by military analysts do not necessarily translate into action, it is clear that a consensus has been building that “[A] ccess to Philippine facilities is much more important than most judged 12 years ago.”[27]

THE APPEARANCE OF BASES

One obstacle however remains: domestic opposition to US military presence in the Philippines. As yet another US Air Force-funded study acknowledges, “On the matter of US access to military facilities in the Philippines, the general view of Philippine security experts is that for domestic political reasons it would be difficult to give the appearance that the United States is reestablishing its bases in the Philippines.”[28]

Hence, the aim has been to avoid giving this appearance. As Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of the US Pacific Command, explained, “[W]e are adapting our plans and cooperation of the past to the future. Those plans do not include any request by the United States for bases in the Philippines of the kind that we have had in the past.” [italics added] [29]

“Our basic interest,” explained former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “is to have the ability to go into a country and have a relationship and have understandings about our ability to land or overfly and to do things that are of mutual benefit to each of us. But we don’t have any particular plans for permanent bases if that’s the kind of thing you mean…”[30]

Thus, instead of “the kind of bases we had in the past”, the US is trying something new.

TRAINING FOR ACCESS

First, the US has stepped up deploying troops, ships, and equipment to the country ostensibly for training exercises, humanitarian and engineering projects, and other missions.

Though the Visiting Forces Agreement was approved in 1998, it was only in 2001 that the number and the size of troops involved in training exercises jumped significantly. Last year alone, up to 37 exercises were scheduled; up from around 24 in the preceding years.[31] As many as 5,000 US troops are involved, depending on the exercise. As a result of these continuing deployments, former US Ambassador to the Philippines Francis Ricciardone has described the US presence in the country as “semi-continuous.”[32]

Apart from training allied troops, the holding of joint exercises allows the US to gain temporary – but repeated and regular – access to the territories of countries in which the exercises are held. As former US PACOM head Admiral Thomas Fargo noted in March 2003, “The habitual relationships built through exercises and training…is our biggest guarantor of access in time of need.”[33]

He said: “Access over time can develop into habitual use of certain facilities by deployed US forces with the eventual goal of being guaranteed use in a crisis, or permission to preposition logistics stocks and other critical material in strategic forward locations.”[34]

As US troops come and go in rotation for frequent and regular exercises, their presence – when taken together – makes up a formidable forward-presence that brings them closer to areas of possible action without need for huge infrastructure to support them and without inciting a lot of public attention and opposition.

As analyst Eric Peltz has told the US House Armed Services Committee: “Other methods of positioning, such as training rotations, can provide a temporary ‘forward position’ or sustain a long-term position without permanent forward unit basing.”[35]

And as US troops depart, they leave behind the infrastructure that they had built and used ostensibly for the exercises and which could still be of use to the US military in the future for missions different from those for which they were initially built.

In General Santos City, for example, the US constructed a deepwater port and one of the most modern domestic airports in the country, connected to each other by one of the country’s best roads. In Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, where US troops routinely go for exercises, the airport has been renovated and its runway strengthened to carry the weight of C-130 planes.[36] In Basilan and Sulu, venues of Balikatan exercises, the US, through USAID, has also built roads and ports that can berth huge ships.

This is consistent with a USAF-funded study which recommended having more deployments to have more infrastructure. By increasing deployments, notes the study, the US can get into arrangements that “include measures to tailor local infrastructure to USAF operations by extending runways, improving air traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons and the like.”[37]

Along with troops, an increasing number of ships have also been entering the country with growing frequency ostensibly for exercises and humanitarian missions. “[T]he Navy counts those ships as providing overseas presence full time, even when they are training or simply tied up at the pier,” said the US Congressional Budget Office.[38]

As has been discussed earlier, the US sees these regular and frequent “temporary” deployments as part of its global “posture.” As the US National Defense Strategy states, “Our posture also includes the many military activities in which we engage around the world. This means not only our physical presence in key regions, but also our training, exercises, and operations.”[39]

BASE SERVICES WITHOUT PERMANENT BASING

Second, the US has obliged the Philippines to provide it with a broad range of locally-provided services that would enable it to launch and sustain operations from the Philippines when necessary.

In September 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free access to its ports and offered it overflight rights.[40] In November 2002, the US and Philippine governments signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) which has been described by researchers with the US Congressional Research Service as “allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region.”[41]

The MLSA obliges the Philippine government to exert “best efforts” to provide the US logistics supplies, support and services during exercises, training, operations, and other US military deployments. The agreement defines these to include food, water, petroleum, oils, clothing, ammunition, spare parts and components, billeting, transportation, communication, medical services, operation support, training services, repair and maintenance, storage services, and port services. “Construction and use of temporary structures” is also covered.[42]

In other words, the MLSA gives the US access to the full range of services that the US military would require to operate in and from the country. Through the MLSA, the US has secured for itself the services that it would normally be able to provide itself inside a large permanent base but without constructing and retaining large permanent bases – and without incurring the costs and the political problems that such bases pose.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS

Third, the US has established in the Philippines a new category of military installations it calls “Cooperative Security Locations” (CSLs).

In August 2005, the Overseas Basing Commission, the official commission tasked to review US basing, categorically identified the Philippines as one of the countries where CSLs are being developed by the United States in the region.[43] As mentioned earlier, CSLs is a new category of bases that refers to facilities owned by host-governments but are to be made available for use by the US military as needed.

The Philippine government has not disclosed the locations and other details about these CSLs. But the description by Robert Kaplan, a prominent American journalist and best-selling author who has visited such facilities around the world, is quoted here in full because of the dearth of information about them and because parts of it could be describing the Philippines –

“A cooperative security location can be a tucked-away corner of a host country’s civilian airport, or a dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private contractors acting as go-betweens… The United States provides aid to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country to better project its own air and naval power in the region.

At the same time, we hold periodic exercises with the host country’s military, in which the base is a focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in the local media…The result is a positive diplomatic context for getting the host country’s approval for use of the base when and if we need it.”[44]

The terms of the MLSA and the establishment of CSLs reflect the US’ increasing emphasis on just-in-time logistics support and pre- positioning of equipment to ensure that US forces – dispersed as they are to be around the world, often far away from main bases where they store equipment and use all kinds of services – are always ready and on the go. Therefore, it is not so much the size of the base that matters but whether it can provide the US military with what it needs, when it’s needed.

As the Council on Foreign Relations points out: “While host nation support often carries the connotation of basing, its role of staging and access is perhaps more critical. Support for port visits, ship repairs, overflight rights, training areas, and opportunities, and areas to marshal, stage, repair, and resupply are no less important for both daily US presence in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis response.”[45]

FORWARD OPERATING BASE

Fourth, the US has succeeded in indefinitely stationing a US military unit in the country.

Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has been deployed to the southern Philippines. While initially presented as being part of on-again off-again temporary training exercises, it has since been revealed that this unit has maintained its presence in the country continuously for the last six years.

With the Philippine government not giving a definite exit date, and with US officials stating that this unit will stay on as long as they are allowed by the government, it is presumed that it will continue to be based in the Philippines for the long-haul.

The unit is headquartered in the Philippine military’s Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City [46] but its “area of operations,” according to a US military publication, spans 8,000 square miles, covering the entire island of Mindanao and its surrounding islands and seas.[47]

According to a comprehensive compilation of various media reports, the number of troops belonging to the unit has ranged between 100 and 450 but it is not clear what the actual total is for a specific period.[48] It varies “depending on the season and the mission,” said US Lt. Col. Mark Zimmer, JSOTF-P public affairs officer.[49]

When it was publicly revealed last month that the US Department of Defense, via a US military construction unit, had granted a contract to a company providing “base operations support” for the JSOTF-P[50], the US embassy admitted that US was setting up allegedly “temporary” structures for “medical, logistical, administrative services” and facilities for “for them to eat, sleep and work.”[51] The Philippine’s own Visiting Forces Commission also confirmed that the US maintains “living quarters” and stocks supplies inside Philippine military camps.[52]

FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

Referring to their bases in Mindanao as “forward operating base-11” and “advanced operating base-921,”[53] the JSOTF-P corresponds to what a US Air Force-sponsored study described as the ongoing “redefinition of what forward presence means.”[54]

In terms of profile and mission, the JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa) which was established in Djibouti in eastern Africa in 2003, also composed mostly of Special Forces, and which has been described as a sample of the US austere basing template and the “model for future US military operations.”[55]

Indeed, more deployments similar to that of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of Africa are planned in other locations around the world in the future. [56] In 2004, former PACOM commander Thomas Fargo talked about expanding Special Operations Forces in the Pacific.[57] Apparently referring to the JSOTF-P, former defense secretary Rumsfeld had also announced that the Pentagon would establish more “nodes for special operations forces.”

“In place of traditional overseas bases with extensive infrastructure,” Rumsfeld said, “we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with prepositioned equipment and rotational presence of personnel… We will maintain a smaller forward-presence force in the Pacific while also stationing agile, expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at our power projection bases.”[58]

The JSOFT-P’s characteristics fit this description. Modest and austere, the JSOTF-P has none of the extensive infrastructure and facilities of the former US bases in Subic and Clark. But with the availability of local logistics and other services assured, the free entry of ships and planes and the pre-positioning of equipment allowed, and with the new roads, ports, and other infrastructure the US has been building in the area, the US Special Forces will be ready and able at a moment’s notice to launch and sustain its operations in the region.

As evidenced by the fact that most Filipinos are not even aware of their presence and their actions, “the JSOTF had succeeded,” notes Kaplan, “as a political mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts up and running…”[59] C.H. Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special Operations Command, under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong, concurs: “After more than 10 years, PACOM has reestablished an acceptable presence in the Philippines…”[60]

Strategically positioned between two routes at the entrance of a major sea-lane, the Makassar Strait, at the southwestern rim of the South China Sea and closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than most of the rest of the Philippines, the JSOTF-P, according to Briscoe, is “now better able to monitor the pulse of the region.”[61]

Having secured this presence, the US has become closer to the country with “the greatest potential to compete militarily” with it. By getting the US “semi-permanently” based south of Luzon for the first time since World War II, Kaplan notes that “the larger-than-necessary base complex” in Zamboanga has delivered more than tactical benefits.[62] In the minds of the US Army strategists, Kaplan notes: “Combating Islamic terrorism in this region [Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the United States: it positioned the US for the future containment of nearby China.”[63]

QUALITATIVELY TRANSFORMED

All of the steps discussed above have paved the way for the gradual and incremental re-entry of the US military to the Philippines. At no time, since 1991, has US military presence been more entrenched. At the same time, this presence is no longer the same; it has been qualitatively transformed.

No longer are US troops permanently stationed and confined inside large bases in two locations in the country. Drawn instead from rotational forces, the troops have been deploying in various locations all over the country for exercises and other missions. Instead of being massed in the thousands inside huge fortifications flying the US flag, they are in the hundreds, dispersed and housed inside camps that technically belong to the Philippine military.

In the past, US troops could, despite the occasional deployment, expect to stay for long periods of time, stationed in the same base for years. Now, they are to be always ready and on the move, prepared to take part in shorter but more frequent deployments overseas.

Before, they stored their equipment, weapons, and supplies in huge storerooms and warehouses inside their base complex at all times, ready to lift and carry them wherever they went; now, they are scattering and storing their equipment and supplies in various locations, guarded and maintained by host-nation governments or private companies, and ready to be picked up on the way to the fighting.

All these changes in the Philippines are driven by the overlapping goals of building up support for and countering domestic opposition to US presence while improving the agility and efficiency of the US military.

TRIAL BALLOONS

But this too could change: for while large bases have their disadvantages, they also provide the guaranteed access, capacities, and other advantages that smaller more austere bases cannot. Also, while the kind of basing that the US is developing now can be useful for certain scenarios, they may not be appropriate and sufficient for others. In case of a long drawn-out standoff, for instance, it would take more than 500 Special Forces stationed in relatively simple bases to sustain US military operations.

Hence, given the right moment and given the need, if plans are not in fact afoot, the US may still want to re-establish larger bases in the Philippines. Given US strategy and the Philippines’ location, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the frequent reports that the US is trying to re-establish bases in the country have been characterized by an analyst with the Brookings Institute as “trial balloons” to test the atmosphere.[64]

For the moment, however, it cannot be said that just because the US does not have large bases of the kind it used to have, the US has not been securing its military objectives in the country. Through the back- door and largely out of sight, the US has gradually but incrementally reintegrated the Philippines firmly within its “global posture.”

All these may have effectively reversed that historic decision, taken 16 years ago, to end nearly a century of US military presence in the country.

*Herbert Docena ( herbert@focusweb.orgThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ) is a researcher with Focus on the Global South

This article was published in three parts by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15-17 October:

Part 1: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? article_id=94438

Part 2:http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? Article_id=94687

Part 3:http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? article_id=94921
NOTES:

[1] US Department of Defense Report to Congress, “Strengthening US Global Defense Posture,” September 2004.

[2] US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, Prepared Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, June 23, 2004, US Department of Defense website:

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=133 [Accessed September 10, 2007].

[3] quoted in G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs September/Octoberober 2002, Vol 81. No 5.

[4] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington D.C., February 6, 2006, pp. V-vi,http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [Accessed September 10, 2007].

[5] US Department of Defense Report to Congress, “Strengthening US Global Defense Posture,” September 2004.

[6] Center for Defense Information, “Worldwide Reorientation of US Military Basing,” September 19, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfmDocumentID=1717&from_page=../program/document.cfm [Accessed September 10, 2007].

[7] Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, January 1988), p. 22, quoted in Christine Wing, “The United States in the Pacific,” in Joseph Gerson and Bruce Richards, eds., The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Network of Foreign US Military Bases (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991), p. 144.

[8] Jim Garamone, “Global Posture Part and Parcel of Transformation,” American Forces Press Service, October 14, 2004

[9] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington DC, p. 53.

[10] John D. Klaus, “US Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, November 17, 2004.

[11] quoted in David Isenberg, “The US Global Posture Review: Reshaping America’s Global Military Footprint,” Basic Notes: Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, British American Security Information Council, November 19, 2004, p. 3.

[12] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick- Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 17-18.

[13] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, Washington DC.

[14] Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest, Number 59 Spring 2000.

[15] George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,” February 11, 2003, www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html [Accessed September 10, 2007]; Conn Hallinan, “Cornering the Dragon,” Counterpunch, February 23, 2005,

http://www.counterpunch.org/hallinan02232005.html [Accessed September 10, 2007]; Mark Mazzetti, “Chinese Arms Threaten Asia, Rumsfeld Says,” Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2005)

[16] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006: Annual Report to Congress, Washington D.C., http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA449718.pdf [Accessed September 9, 2007]

[17] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington D.C., February 6, 2006, p. 29, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf [Accessed September 10, 2007]

[18] Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, “Asia 2025” Organized by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July to 4 August 1999, Newport Rhode Island, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf [Accessed June 12, 2007], p. 76.

[19] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001; Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, “Asia 2025” Organized by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July to 4 August 1999, Newport Rhode Island,

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf [Accessed June 12, 2007]; Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, September 2000.

[20] Michael Richardson, “US Wants More Use of South Asian Bases,” International Herald Tribune, February 8, 2002.

[21] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript of hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.

[22] Robert D. Kaplan, “How we would fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly, June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed June 14, 2005].

[23] Rosemary Foot, “US Foreign- and Domestic-policy Realignments after September 11,” Adelphi Papers, Volume 44, Issue 363, February 2004.

[24] Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century, September 2000, Washington DC, p. 35.

[25] Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chaise, Derek Eaton, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and their Implications for the United States, Sta Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Project Air Force, 2007, p. 112.

[26] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick- Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, p. xxii.

[27] Michael McDevitt, “US Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: Southeast Asia,” in US Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region conference proceedings, May 5, 2003.

[28] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 182.

[29] Transcript, Press Conference with Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, Manila, July 13, 2001.

[30] Transcript, Press Conference with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 25, 2002

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t04262002_t0425er.html [Accessed September 10, 2007].

[31] Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,'” MindaNews, February 28, 2005; Jojo Due, “Biggest RP-US military exercise starts next week,” Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006.

[32] Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,'” MindaNews, February 28, 2005.

[33] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript of hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.

[34] Admiral Thomas Fargo, Transcript of Hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.

[35] Eric Peltz, “Toward an Expeditionary Army: New Options for Combatant Commanders,” Testimony Presented to the House Armed Services Committee on March 24, 2004, p. 3.

[36] Karl Wilson, “US force in Asia to become smaller but deadlier,” Daily Times, August 22, 2004.

[37] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 63.

[38] Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, “Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet,” May 2006

[39] US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy 2005, Washington D.C., pp. 18-19.

[40] Rufi Vigilar, “Philippines opens its ports to U.S. Military,” CNN, September 18, 2001.

[41] Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines: Background and US Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 10, 2006, http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33233_20060110.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2007]; Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the US Pacific Command,” National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, Volume 14, Number 2, August 2003.

[42] Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines, November 21, 2002.

[43] Overseas Basing Commission, Report to the President and Congress, August 15, 2005, p. H11, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2007].

[44] Robert D. Kaplan, “How we would fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly, June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed June 14, 2005].

[45] Council on Foreign Relations, The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration, July 2001, pp. 47-48. http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SEAsiaTF.pdf [Accessed September 10, 2007].

[46] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.147.

[47] T.D. Flack, “Special Operations Force Aiding an Important Ally,” Stars and Stripes, March 11, 2007; Col. Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military Review, November to December 2006.

[48] At start of the deployment in January 2002, there were supposed to be 160 to 250 who were joining. (Steve Vogel, “Americans Arrive in Philippines U.S. Special Forces To Aid Filipino Army In Threatened Areas,” Washington Post, January 16, 2002; Fe B. Zamora, “All US troops will leave on July 31, says Wurster,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002; Pat Roque, “US Special Forces in Philippines,” Associated Press, February 18, 2002; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Philippine confusion,” Washington Times, February 8, 2002). In November 2002, the Army Magazine reported that there were 260 members of the task force were in the southern Philippines. (Army Magazine, “News Call,” November 1, 2002). In February 2003, 350 Special Forces were reportedly scheduled to be sent to Sulu but this was postponed. (Eric Schmitt, “US combat force of 1700 is headed to the Philippines”, New York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley Graham, “US Bolsters Philippine Force,” Washington Post, February 21, 2003) In Octoberober 2003, 300 Special Forces were reported to be in Basilan (US spy aircraft deployed in Philippines,” Octoberober 13, 2003 The News International (Pakistan). By February 2006, 250 more troops were reported to be joining those who were already in Sulu but it was not clear how many were still there at that time (“RP-US to conduct war games amid ‘rape’ controversy, Philipine Daily Inquirer, January 10, 2006; “No time frame of US troops’ stay in Sulu, Mindanews, January 17, 2006). Shortly after, US military spokesperson Capt Burrel Parmer announced that 400 US troops will be Sulu for various projects. (Ding Cervantes, “5,500 US military personnel coming for Balikatan 2006,” Philippine Star, February 17, 2006). In September 2006, 114 US troops were reported to have arrived in Zamboanga City as part of the “normal rotation” of soldiers under JSOTF-P, according to the US embassy. (Julie Alipala, “100 Gis held at Zambo immigration,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2006). In February 2007, US today reported 450 and Reuters put the number at 100 (Paul Wiseman, “In Philippines, US Making Progress in War on Terror,” USA Today, Februay 13, 2007; “Philippines increases security for US forces,” Reuters, February 26, 2007).

[49] “Civilians want probe on US military’s alleged supervision in Sulu war,” MindaNews, November 24, 2005.

[50] In August 2007, Focus on the Global South publicized the granting by the US Deparment of Defense, through the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), of a six-month $14.4-million contract to a certain “Global Contingency Services LLC” of Irving, Texas for “operations support” for the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). According to its own website, the NAVFAC is the unit within the US military that is in charge of providing the US Navy with “operating, support, and training bases.” It “manages the planning, design, and construction and provides public works support for US Naval shore installations around the world.” Among their business lines are “bases development” and “contingency engineering.” According to the announcement by the Pentagon, the contract awarded to Global Contingency Services LLC includes “all labor, supervision, management, tools, materials, equipment, facilities, transportation, incidental engineering, and other items necessary to provide facilities support services.” Global Contingency Services LLC is a partnership between DynCorp International, Parsons Global Services, and PWC Logistics. The $14.4 million contract is actually part of a bigger $450-million five-year contract for Global Contingency Services to “provide a full range of world-wide contingency and disaster-response services, including humanitarian assistance and interim or transitional base-operating support services.” According to DynCorp’s website, this will include “facility operations and maintenance; air operations; port operations; health care; supply and warehousing; galley; housing support; emergency services; security, fire, and rescue; vehicle equipment; and incidental construction.” Contingency Response Services LLC describes its work as encompassing “operating forces support,” “community support,” and “base support.” According to the Defense Industry Daily publication, the contract also includes “morale, welfare, and recreation support.” The specific contract for work for the JSOTF-P is expected to be completed in January 2008 but other contracts may follow as part of the $450 million-package. (“Contracts, June 6, 2007,” US Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3532 ; Press Release, “DynCorp International and JV Partners Win $450 million NAVFAC Contract,” DynCorp International, November 2, 2006, www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=197; “Contingency Response Services,” DynCorp International, www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=204; Defense Industry Daily, “$14.4M to help US SOCOM in the Philippines,” June 8, 2007, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=philippines; Ethan Butterfield, “DynCorp lands $450M Navy Contingency Services Deal,” Washington Technology, November 3, 2006; www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/29650-1.htm [Accessed August 20, 2007]

[51] “US denies building bases in Mindanao,” GMANews.TV, August 27, 2007.

[52] Veronica Uy, “VFACom Chief Denies US bases in Mindanao,” Inquirer.net, August 24, 2007.

[53] Maj. Kevin T. Henderson, US Army, “Army Special Operations Forces and Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Integration: Something a Joint Task Force Commander should Consider,” monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, May 19, 2004; Cherilyn Walley, “Impact of the semi-permissive environment on force protection in Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare, September 2004; T.D. Flack, “When Visiting Jolo, Show a Little Courtesy, Please,” Stars and Stripes, March 12, 2007.

[54] Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David A. Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak, Alan J. Vick, A New Division of Labor: Meeting America’s Security Challenges Beyond Iraq, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007, p.15.

[55] Stanley A. Weiss, “After Iraq, a New US Military Model,” International Herald Tribune, December 27, 2006.

[56] Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld details big military shift in new document,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2005.

[57] US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington DC, September 23, 2004; Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, “Regarding the Defense Global Forces Posture Review,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 23, 2004.

[58] US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2005, p. 36.

[59] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.150.

[60] C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1,” Special Warfare, September 2004.

[61] C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1,” Special Warfare, September 2004.

[62] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.178.

[63] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.134.

[64] Catharin Dalpino, “Separatism and Terrorism in the Philippines: Distinctions and Options for US Policy,” Testimony to Subcommitee on East Asia and the Pacific, House International Relations Committee, June 10, 2003.

Source: http://focusweb.org/an-acceptable-presence-the-new-us-basing-structure-in-the-philippines.html?Itemid=93

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